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CLAIM SPLITTING IN THE NEW WORLD OF SEVERAL
LIABILITY AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
JONATHAN M. HOFFMAN*
ABSTRACT
General aviation accident litigation has recently become more
complicated, with multiple lawsuits filed in multiple venues to
litigate the same crash. An informal poll at the Air Law Sympo-
sium indicated that a large percentage of the attendees had
been involved in such cases.
Two primary forces likely give rise to these multiple lawsuits.
First, with the demise of joint and several liability, plaintiffs are
often forced to sue more defendants and for defendants to add
more third-party defendants. Second, the more rigorous per-
sonal jurisdiction standards articulated by the United States Su-
preme Court in the past decade have tightened both general
and specific jurisdiction. As a result, finding a single forum with
personal jurisdiction over all parties has become more difficult.
In this environment, many complications can arise for plain-
tiffs, defendants, and third-party defendants. Deciding what law
applies can be a complex problem with a single case in a single
forum. It is far more complicated with multiple lawsuits in multi-
ple states. The demise of joint and several liability in most states
creates problems, too. When one case is filed in a joint and sev-
eral state, and others are filed in various several liability states,
there can be confusion galore, not only between the joint and
several state and the others but also from significant differences
in the application of several liability among the several liability
states. One state’s law may preclude several liability as to prod-
uct manufacturers, and others may not; some may limit several
liability to noneconomic damages or set a threshold percentage
* Jonathan M. Hoffman is a Harvard graduate and a University of Oregon law
school graduate. He is a senior partner at MB Law Group LLP in Portland,
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of fault above which a defendant is still subject to joint and sev-
eral liability. One state may permit the jury to weigh fault allo-
cated by non-parties; others may require timely pleading of
claims of non-party fault or preclude allocation to non-parties
altogether. Along with traditional constraints, such as whether a
party can pursue multiple lawsuits, the risks of res judicata and
taking different positions in different lawsuits are important is-
sues for all parties.
There are ways to minimize duplicative effort, such as using
Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) proceedings under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407. MDLs can mitigate multiple lawsuits in multiple states
but are often slow in resolving cases, and they ordinarily remand
the cases to their original fora for trial. State courts lack any
method of consolidating cases pending in other states. This Arti-
cle addresses a variety of possible methods that may help handle
these issues, as well as identifying those that are likely to be
useless.
Many of these issues have been addressed in other contexts,
such as articles about the effect of a particular state’s change
from joint and several liability to that state’s adoption of a form
of several liability. However, no single publication identifies the
potential complications of litigating multiple lawsuits in multi-
ple states arising from the same accident. The Third Restate-
ment of Torts, Apportionment of Liability, discusses five
categories of joint and several or several liability but, under-
standably, not the other complications of multiple lawsuits. Fur-
thermore, some states’ laws have changed since the Restatement
was published two decades ago. This Article attempts to help
litigators, whether for plaintiffs or defendants, anticipate the is-
sues they may face if multiple lawsuits are filed out of the same
crash and attempts to identify the risks and alternatives to be
considered.
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I. INTRODUCING OUR NEW WORLD
IMAGINE A GENERAL AVIATION accident case, brought onbehalf of a plaintiff domiciled in State A, which occurred in
State B, in which a component manufacturer based in State C
sells a component to an engine manufacturer in State D, who
sells the engine to the aircraft manufacturer in State E, who, in
turn, sells an airplane equipped with this engine to a Customer
in State F. The customer takes the aircraft to State G for inspec-
tion and maintenance at a repair station. No lawsuit has been
filed, and the causes of the accident are still uncertain, but there
is some legitimate basis to think that each of the above potential
defendants might be at fault. Is there a way to bring all the par-
ties into one common venue? How does one decide which
state(s) the plaintiff should file the lawsuit(s) in? And how
should the defendant(s) respond?
These issues are hardly novel. But the calculation has changed
dramatically because of the interaction of two developments in
the law: (1) the replacement of joint and several liability with
numerous forms of several liability;1 and (2) the tightening of
the due process threshold for personal jurisdiction.2 Several lia-
bility, ever-expanding and evolving since the 1980s, often en-
courages both sides to add more parties to the litigation.3
Further, the recent tightening of the standards for personal ju-
risdiction complicates the parties’ efforts to crowd all the parties
into a single venue.4
Can or should the plaintiff file multiple lawsuits in different
states, to ensure that at least one lawsuit—somewhere—will rec-
ognize personal jurisdiction and thereby permit a trial and pos-
sible recovery against every defendant? Will the courts permit
the filing of multiple duplicative lawsuits in multiple venues on
behalf of the same plaintiff for the same injury? And even if the
courts do, and even if the plaintiff prevails, how will each court
allocate fault in light of the variations of several liability among
the states? This new environment can create serious complica-
tions for unprepared plaintiffs and defendants alike. Likewise, it
may open new opportunities that other, less-prepared parties ig-
nore at their peril.
1 See discussion infra Section II.A.
2 See discussion infra Section II.B.
3 See discussion infra Sections II.A.3, II.A.4.
4 See discussion infra Section II.B.
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Each decision in this hypothetical situation carries serious
risks. Plaintiffs now have few, if any, options for choosing a sin-
gle forum in which all defendants will be subject to personal
jurisdiction.5 Due to several liability rules in many states, plain-
tiffs face greater risks that their “success” at a trial may short-
change a faultless plaintiff who walks away with only a modest
percentage of their compensatory damages.6 Timothy Loranger
of the Baum Hedlund firm articulated plaintiffs’ concerns at the
2016 50th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium.7
Defendants face similar risks. Wherever the plaintiff files law-
suits, some defendants are likely to challenge personal jurisdic-
tion, and some are likely to succeed. Those who succeed may get
off scot-free or merely get sued elsewhere. Others stay behind
and, depending on the forum’s law, may not be able to allocate
fault to those who have obtained dismissals or those who have
settled. If some tortfeasors cannot be joined in the same action,
the remaining defendants face the risk that they might get stuck
defending multiple lawsuits in multiple venues, unable to allo-
cate substantial liability to others. What other tortfeasors have
paid in settlement to the plaintiff in other venues may not offset
the remaining defendants’ exposure because several liability ju-
risdictions typically eliminate the offset of prior settlements.8 A
clever plaintiff may be able to divide and conquer by picking off
the defendants one by one and, with the right case, recover
more than 100% of the compensatory damages. For example, a
plaintiff could persuade each defendant to settle separately for
50% of the likely total verdict. Then several liability could pro-
duce a significantly more generous result than the joint and sev-
eral system it replaced.
Settling cases may also be complicated when there are multi-
ple lawsuits in multiple states. Settlements have consequences
for both the parties who settle and those who do not. Settling
defendants want to be certain that they have no remaining obli-
gations, not only in respect to the plaintiff but also vis-à-vis non-
settling defendants or others who might become parties in the
future. Non-settling defendants may be significantly affected, de-
5 Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
32–33 (2018); see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1784, 1789 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), rev’g 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016).
6 See generally infra Appendix A.
7 Timothy Loranger, Shareholder, Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman, Ad-
dress at the 55th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium (Mar. 31–Apr. 1, 2016).
8 See generally infra Appendix A.
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pending on which state’s law governs and whether it permits al-
location of fault to those who have settled.9
A few decades ago, a plaintiff would typically file the general
aviation accident crash case described above in one forum—per-
haps State A, where the plaintiff resided, or State B, where the
crash occurred. Typically, “a plaintiff needed to bring only one
action to recover her full damages.”10 Challenges to personal ju-
risdiction were relatively infrequent. Attempts to challenge per-
sonal jurisdiction were usually unsuccessful11 and, consequently,
often not brought at all. A joint and several liability system ena-
bled experienced lawyers on all sides to estimate the verdict
value of the single case in a single venue, assess the likelihood of
winning or losing, and evaluate the proportionate risk their re-
spective clients faced.
Various types of lawsuits create opportunities to litigate in
multiple venues. This is increasingly common in general avia-
tion cases. Polling data12 from the 55th Annual SMU Air Law
Symposium in March 2021 suggested that 75% of respondents
had been involved in one or more cases involving multiple law-
suits in multiple states arising from the same general aviation
crash.13 Approximately 45% of the respondents experienced
this situation more than three times, and 68% of the respon-
dents noted that they typically represented the defendant.14
By its very nature, aviation usually involves interstate or inter-
national travel, as well as multiple parties located in a variety of
9 See generally infra Appendix A.
10 John Scott Hickman, Note, Efficiency, Fairness, and Common Sense: The Case for
One Action as to Percentage of Fault in Comparative Negligence Jurisdictions That Have
Abolished or Modified Joint and Several Liability, 48 VAND. L. REV. 739, 749 (1995).
11 See, e.g., Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. AVCO Corp., 804 F.2d 1367, 1371
(5th Cir. 1986); AVCO Corp. v. Precision Airmotive, Inc., No. Civ.A.3:03-CV-2720-
K, 2004 WL 1836959, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2004); Hayworth v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 690 F. Supp. 962, 964 (D. Wyo. 1988); W. Helicopters, Inc. v. Rogerson
Aircraft Corp., 715 F. Supp. 1486, 1490 (D. Or. 1989); Eason v. Linden Avionics,
Inc., 706 F. Supp. 311, 324 (D.N.J. 1989); State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols
Corp. v. Dale, 657 P.2d 211, 212 (Or. 1982). But see, e.g., Bearry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Helicopter & Airplane Servs.
Corp., 389 F. Supp. 509, 521–22 (D. Md. 1974).
12 55th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium Poll, conducted by Jonathan Hoff-
man, Senior Partner, MB Law Group LLP (Mar. 14–15, 2021) (on file with au-
thor). The polling data represents the answers from 64 respondents. This data is
not intended to be viewed as a representative sample but rather as illustrative of
the commonality of multi-state and multi-party disputes in aviation for attendees
of the 55th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium.
13 Id.
14 Id.
2021] CLAIM SPLITTING IN THE NEW WORLD 383
locations. Even before the advent of several liability and the
tightening of personal jurisdiction standards, aviation lawyers
had to consider venue problems and options.15 However, venue
challenges seemed more likely to be addressed via forum non
conveniens motions.16
This Article begins with a summary of the evolution and cur-
rent state of several liability and personal jurisdiction. Section
II.A summarizes the wide variety of several liability laws in the
majority of the fifty states. Several liability is important in these
cases because of its role in adding more parties to the lawsuit.
Furthermore, each variation of several liability may provide sig-
nificant risks or rewards in a particular case. For these reasons,
Appendix A of this Article summarizes the principal variations
of fault allocation in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.
Recent developments in personal jurisdiction law have been
the subject of numerous commentaries,17 but the focus in Sec-
tion II.B is to relate the effects of personal jurisdiction in mul-
tiparty, multivenue litigation while also considering the
significance of several liability.
II. WHAT’S CHANGED?
A. JOINT & SEVERAL AND JUST SEVERAL
1. Joint & Several: All or Nothing
Common law tort claims were typically decided by “the tradi-
tional all-or-nothing system of tort responsibility.”18 If a faultless
plaintiff proved that a defendant was at fault and caused the in-
jury, the plaintiff obtained a full recovery.19 A plaintiff could sue
two tortfeasors in separate actions and recover 100% of damages
from each.20 A plaintiff guilty of contributory fault, even if mi-
15 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 238 (1981); Kern v. Jep-
pesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 537 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Myers v. Boeing
Co., 794 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Wash. 1990) (en banc).
16 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 238 (1981); Kern v. Jep-
pesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 537 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Myers v. Boeing
Co., 794 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Wash. 1990) (en banc).
17 See, e.g., Philip S. Goldberg, Christopher E. Appel & Victor E. Schwartz, The
U.S. Supreme Court’s Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm Shift to End Litigation Tourism, 14
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 51 (2019); Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth
Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. 499 (2018); Erwin Chemerinsky,
An Uphill Battle over Jurisdiction, 53 TRIAL 58 (2017).
18 DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 142 (Cal. 1992).
19 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (3d ed. 1964).
20 Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69, 69 (Mass. 1902).
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nuscule, recovered nothing.21 Traditional joint and several lia-
bility rules also barred the defendant from obtaining
contribution from more culpable tortfeasors.22 The common
law rule was that one tortfeasor could not recover contribution
from another tortfeasor because they were “in pari delicto.”23
2. The Demise of Joint and Several Liability
Comparative fault in lieu of traditional contributory negli-
gence first appeared in tort law in the early twentieth century,
under the Federal Employers Liability Act.24 The State of Wis-
consin recognized comparative fault several decades later.25 But
by the 1950s, only five jurisdictions in the United States had rec-
ognized comparative fault.26 Other states had taken smaller
steps to mitigate the all-or-nothing stakes of contributory negli-
gence by recognizing common law exceptions, most notably the
“last clear chance” rule.27
3. Comparative Fault Leads to Several Liability
The movement for states to adopt comparative fault began in
the mid-1970s.28 Plaintiffs would not be deprived of a remedy
altogether if they were partially at fault.29 The Uniform Contri-
bution Among Tortfeasors Act allowed contribution between
joint tortfeasors so that a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor could
be shared among the defendants.30 Whereas the common law
rejected contribution between joint tortfeasors of equal guilt,31
contribution invoked “the equity doctrine that those who are
21 See PROSSER, supra note 19, at 427.
22 Id. at 273.
23 See id.; see also Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337
(K.B. 1799).
24 Act of April 22, 1908, ch. 149, §3, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. § 53).
25 WIS. STAT. § 331.045 (effective June 16, 1931) (current version at WIS. STAT.
§ 895.045 (2021)).
26 Hickman, supra note 10, at 742.
27 See, e.g., Fuller v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 56 So. 783, 785–86 (Miss. 1911);
Kumkumian v. City of New York, 111 N.E. 2d 865, 869 (N.Y. 1953).
28 Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87
YALE L.J. 697, 697–98 (1978).
29 See id. at 727; Jonathan Cardi, Note, Apportioning Responsibility to Immune Non-
parties: An Argument Based on Comparative Responsibility and the Proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1300 (1997).
30 See Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 1(a) (1955).
31 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 102 (AM. L. INST. 1937).
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jointly liable should share the burden equally.”32 Initially, contri-
bution split the liability equally among tortfeasors rather than
based on relative percentages of fault, and a tortfeaser could not
seek contribution if it had committed an intentional tort.33
These rules provided compensation to more plaintiffs than
before, but some notable cases forced deep-pocket defendants
to pay vastly disproportionate percentages of a judgment even if
their fault was de minimis.34 The liberal expansion of tort law in
the middle of the twentieth century resulted in significant in-
creases in lawsuits and larger verdicts for plaintiffs, thereby “dis-
mantling no-duty and limited-duty rules and abolishing
immunities.”35 The business community reacted with a variety of
forms of tort reform starting in the 1970s.36 In 1986, the Ameri-
can Tort Reform Association (ATRA) was formed with the sup-
port of both the medical community and a number of business
entities.37
32 Daniel C. Arnold, Recent Case, Torts—Contribution—Liability of United States
Under Federal Tort Claims Act.—United States v. Yellow Cab Co. and Capital Transit
Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 543 (1951), 30 TEX. L. REV. 529, 529 (1952) (citing
Brown & Root, Inc. v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 257 (S.D. Tex. 1950)).
33 This doctrine is best illustrated in The Highwayman’s Case (Everet v. Williams,
9 L.Q. REV. 197 (1893)), in which “one robber sought an accounting from an-
other for goods stolen in a joint venture. The court decided the matter by order-
ing them both beheaded, denying, of course, any right to contribution.” Perry J.
Radoff, Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 44 TEX. L. REV. 326, 330
(1965).
34 See, e.g., Dunham v. Kampman, 547 P.2d 263, 266 (Colo. App. 1975), aff’d en
banc, 560 P.2d 91 (Colo. 1977) (defendant 1% at fault required to pay entire
judgment because plaintiff’s husband, 99% at fault, was immune from suit); Walt
Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. 1987) (Disney found 1% at
fault but had to pay 86% of judgment); Davis v. O’Brien, 891 P.2d 1307, 1308,
1317–18 (Or. 1995) (en banc) (verdict found non-party 96.5% at fault and defen-
dant 3.5% at fault, defendant had to pay nearly 50%, and the state legislature
enacted several liability legislation shortly thereafter); see Gregory R. Mowe &
Katherine A. McDowell, Changing the Rules: Tracking Oregon’s Trail of “Tort Reform,”
55 OR. ST. BAR BULL. 17, 20 (1995).
35 Dominick Vetri, The Integration of Tort Law Reforms and Liability Insurance
Ratemaking in the New Age, 66 OR. L. REV. 277, 278 (1987). Professor Vetri cata-
logues numerous examples of these changes. Id. at 278 nn.1–4, 279 nn.5–8, 280
nn.9–15, 281 nn.16–19, 282 nn.20–25, 283 n.26.
36 Scott DeVito & Andrew Jurs, An Overreaction to a Nonexistent Problem: Empirical
Analysis of Tort Reform From the 1980s to 2000s, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 62, 69
(2015).
37 About, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, https://www.atra.org/about [https://
perma.cc/7BUG-VCC8]. Among the issues on which the ATRA lists on its website
is “Joint and Several Liability,” and the ATRA advocates a “proportionate liability
system,” in which a “co-defendant that is found by a jury to be 20% responsible
for a plaintiff’s injury would be required to pay no more than 20% of the entire
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Defense-oriented groups argued that if comparative negli-
gence enabled plaintiffs to recover despite their negligence, de-
fendants’ liability should also be limited to their relative degrees
of fault.38 And, if plaintiff and defendant were both subject to
liability proportionate to their fault, why shouldn’t comparative
fault involve all tortfeasors, whether parties or not?
All comparative fault systems attempt to balance two conflicting
objectives. One is that each person involved in an action be liable
only in proportion to his or her share of the total fault. The
other is that full compensation be awarded to injured plaintiffs.
These competing goals represent conflicting values and cannot
both be given priority by any given system.39
Consequently, since 1986, a majority of states have recognized
several liability in some form.40 However, the variations are nu-
merous and can have a significant impact on the outcomes of
particular cases.41 “Pure” joint and several liability now applies
only in eight states and the District of Columbia, although nu-
merous other states retain joint and several liability in some cat-
egories of cases, such as intentional torts, strict liability,
economic damages, and where a tortfeasor’s fault is judged to
be above a prescribed percentage.42
4. The Many Flavors of Several Liability
Plaintiffs and defendants who face the prospect of litigating
multiple lawsuits in multiple venues arising from the same claim
need to understand and appreciate the critical variations by
which state law now defines several liability. One should never
underestimate the significance of these variations. States may
not describe their systems in the same way,43 but the details of
each state’s laws are critical for several liability systems. As previ-
settlement.” Joint and Several Liability, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, https://
www.atra.org/issue/joint-several-liability/ [https://perma.cc/3JR2-JPM9].
38 See Joint and Several Liability, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, https://www.atra.org/
issue/joint-several-liability/ [https://perma.cc/3JR2-JPM9]. See generally Michael
L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice
System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 69, 72–79, 81–88
(2002).
39 Hickman, supra note 10, at 744 (footnotes omitted).
40 See infra Appendix A.
41 See id.
42 See infra Appendix B (identifying some, but not all, of the variations adopted
by the states).
43 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 17 cmt.
a (AM L. INST. 2000).
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ously pointed out, the changes in allocation law, together with
more restrictive personal jurisdiction standards, encourage
some plaintiffs to file multiple lawsuits in multiple venues aris-
ing from the same claim.44 Multiple lawsuits may help plaintiffs
pursue all tortfeasors, even if some cannot be required to par-
ticipate in the primary lawsuit. However, unearthing all the nu-
ances of several liability rules in all states is a complex task.
a. Past Resources
As more states adopted several liability in the 1980s and 1990s,
numerous law reviews published articles on various aspects of
the subject, and as the states experience how several liability
works in practice, more articles have appeared.45 Some articles
focus on a specific variable of a particular state’s legislation.46
Some of the earlier articles summarized the variations of each
state and may be helpful for a lawyer who seeks to know how
44 Cf. James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 769, 773–74
(1999).
45 See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages Among
Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831 (1989); Cardi, supra note 29; Edward J.
Kionka, Recent Developments in the Law of Joint and Several Liability and the Impact of
Plaintiff’s Employer’s Fault, 54 LA. L. REV. 1619, 1630 (1994); William Westerbeke,
The Application of Comparative Responsibility to Intentional Tortfeasors and Immune Par-
ties, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 189 (2000); Nancy C. Marcus, Phantom Parties and
Other Practical Problems With the Attempted Abolition of Joint and Several Liability, 60
ARK. L. REV. 437 (2007); Laura Kingsley Hong & Robert E. Haffke, Apportioning
Liability in Asbestos Litigation: A Review of the Law in Key Jurisdictions, 26 T.M. COO-
LEY L. REV. 681 (2009).
46 See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Interpretation of the Statutory Modification of Joint and
Several Liability: Resisting the Deconstruction of Tort Reform, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 1, 51–52 (1992); Kionka, supra note 45, at 1630; Carol A. Mutter, Moving to
Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L.
REV. 199, 272–73 (1990); Robert B. Ireland, III, Comment, Modified Joint and Sev-
eral Liability in Mississippi: The Absent Settling Tortfeasor and the Immune Employer, 70
MISS. L.J. 821 (2000); Hickman, supra note 10, at 742; Paul Bargren, Comment,
Joint and Several Liability: Protection for Plaintiffs, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 453 (1994);
Clare Elizabeth Krumlauf, Note, Ohio’s New Modified Joint and Several Liability
Laws: A Fair Compromise for Competing Parties and Public Policy Interests, 53 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 333 (2005–2006); Samuel T. Waddell, Comment, Examining the Evolution
of Nonparty Fault Apportionment in Arkansas: Must a Defendant Pay More Than Its Fair
Share?, 66 ARK. L. REV. 485 (2013); Mike Steenson, The STAAB Saga: The Nonparty,
Joint and Several Liability, and Loss Reallocation in the Minnesota Comparative Fault
Act, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1156 (2016); Michael Koty Newman, Note, The
Elephant Not in the Room: Apportionment to Nonparties in Georgia, 50 GA. L. REV. 669
(2016).
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certain states address several liability issues.47 However, there is
no current list of the state-by-state variations of several liability.
Nor is there any discussion about how to deal with those vari-
ables in the context of the recent, more rigorous standards for
personal jurisdiction. This Article provides a current summary
of state several liability rules and suggests avenues to deal with
pursuing or defending multiple lawsuits in multiple venues—
including those that may work and those that are more
problematic.
b. Restatement Third
Comments to the Third Restatement of Torts, Apportionment
of Liability, summarize five different versions of joint and several
or several liability.48 The Restatement states that “there is cur-
rently no majority rule on this question, although joint and sev-
eral liability has been substantially modified in most
jurisdictions both as a result of the adoption of comparative
fault and tort reform during the 1980s and 1990s.”49 The Re-
statement’s five tracks are mutually exclusive, but the comments
acknowledge that modifications (or differing combinations of
some) of them are possible.50 The Restatement summarizes the
five tracks, along with the Reporters’ principal comments, as
follows:
(1) PURE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY. Subsidiary issues impli-
cated by this premise include “identifying those who may
be submitted to the jury for assignment of a percentage
of comparative responsibility and the treatment of claims
against an employer who is immune from tort liability be-
cause of the exclusive remedy bar of workers’
compensation.”51
(2) PURE SEVERAL LIABILITY. Each party is only liable for its
own percentage of fault.52
(3) HYBRID JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY FOR INDEPENDENT
TORTFEASORS WHO CAUSE AN INDIVISIBLE INJURY. This ap-
47 See, e.g., James J. Scheske, Comment, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability
Theory: A Survey of State Approaches, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 627, 649–50 (1988);
Kionka, supra note 45, at 1630–31.
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proach “places the risk of a tortfeasor’s insolvency on all
parties who bear responsibility for the plaintiff’s damages,
including the plaintiff. An insolvent tortfeasor’s compara-
tive share of responsibility is reallocated to the other par-
ties in proportion to their comparative responsibility. A
very similar result is obtained by starting with a rule of
several liability but then providing for reallocation in the
event of insolvency. This approach also addresses which
persons should be subject to an assignment of compara-
tive responsibility and the effect of that allocation on the
apportionment of liability among the parties.”53 Theoreti-
cally, this approach is “the most appealing in that it ap-
portions the risk of insolvency to the remaining parties in
the case in proportion to their responsibility, thereby pro-
viding an equitable mechanism for coping with insol-
vency. There may be administrative and practical
difficulties with the reallocation provisions” under such
an approach.54
(4) HYBRID SYSTEM IN WHICH JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY IS
IMPOSED ON INDEPENDENT TORTFEASORS WHOSE PERCENT-
AGE OF COMPARATIVE RESPONSIBILITY EXCEEDS A SPECIFIED
THRESHOLD. “Tortfeasors assigned a modest percentage of
comparative responsibility below the threshold are sever-
ally liable, while those at or above the threshold are
jointly and severally liable.”55 This approach “responds to
the concern that many tortfeasors whose responsibility
for a plaintiff’s injury is quite minimal are held liable for
the entirety of the recoverable damages under a pure
joint-and-several-liability scheme. However, any threshold
is an imperfect way to screen out tangential tortfeasors,
and often the threshold is set too high (50 percent) to
serve this function well. When there are many tortfeasors,
this Track does not perform well, as it virtually guarantees
that several liability will be imposed, regardless of the role
of any given tortfeasor in the plaintiff’s injuries. This
threshold series also imposes the risk of insolvency on an
entirely innocent plaintiff whenever all solvent defend-
ants are below the specified threshold. To the extent that
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the adoption of comparative responsibility so that the
plaintiff may also be legally culpable, imposing the risk of
insolvency on an innocent plaintiff is unwarranted.”56
(5) HYBRID SYSTEM, IN WHICH THE VARIABLE THAT DETERMINES
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY OR SEVERAL LIABILITY IS THE
TYPE OF HARM SUFFERED BY THE PLAINTIFF. Independent
tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for economic
damages but severally liable for noneconomic harm. “Ap-
portioning the risk of insolvency in this fashion (i.e., de-
fendants bear it with regard to economic harm and
plaintiffs bear it with regard to noneconomic harms) thus
treats the recovery of economic loss as more important to
a plaintiff. In addition, damages for economic harm, be-
ing susceptible to objective proof, are subject to consider-
ably less variance in their determination by the
factfinder.”57 “Some critics contend that this Track works
an injustice to those who are not wage earners and
thereby suffer a greater proportion of noneconomic dam-
ages in a lawsuit. Others, including those that focus on
deterrence, would also dispute the proposition that
noneconomic damages are less important than economic
damages. This Track also treats unfairly the plaintiff who
is not comparatively responsible for the injury by impos-
ing the risk of insolvency for noneconomic loss on the
innocent plaintiff rather than the culpable defendants.
Finally, this Track creates some administrative and practi-
cal difficulties in its operation.”58
c. Other Sources: How “Several” is Each Forum?
Although a majority of states have adopted several liability,
the variations among the states are significant. In choosing a fo-
rum or deciding where to litigate among multiple venues, a par-
ticular feature could be critical to a specific party in a specific
case. Among the most important variables are as follows:
(1) What categories of conduct are subject to several liability?
Some states exclude strict liability, and some exclude in-
tentional torts.
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(3) What categories of non-parties, if any, can be allocated?
For example, a state might not permit allocation to a per-
son or company not subject to jurisdiction in the forum.
Another might not permit allocation to someone im-
mune from suit.
(4) What, if any, prerequisites exist to assign fault to non-par-
ties? Some states set a deadline for defendants to plead or
disclose such non-parties and may include deadlines for
plaintiffs or defendants to add them as parties.
(5) Does a defendant lose the right to allocate fault if its per-
centage of fault is above a prescribed percentage?
(6) Are there rules that permit reallocation if one or more of
the defendants cannot pay their share?
(7) How do settlements affect allocation by the remaining
parties?59
Several sources list state-by-state variations, but none of them
are perfect. For example, the Restatement provides a list of the
variations and which states have adopted them.60 However, the
Restatement’s list was compiled in 2000, and changes have oc-
curred since that time.61 ATRA, an organization that actively
sought to replace joint and several liability, includes on its web-
site the most current list available.62 ATRA’s website lists the
states in which joint and several liability was changed or elimi-
nated.63 However, the site provides little information about the
particulars of each state’s form of several liability.
d. Current Summary of State-by-State Several Liability
Appendix A to this Article provides a current chart and sum-
maries of the primary rules in several liability states, along with
each state’s idiosyncrasies. First, Appendix A identifies which
states presently adhere to joint and several liability and have
adopted some form of several liability. In addition, it identifies
the several liability states that (1) permit allocation to non-par-
ties in some form; (2) exclude strict product liability from sev-
eral liability; (3) impose a threshold for several liability, either of
59 See infra Appendix A.
60 Id.
61 See infra Appendix A. States which have added joint and several liability rules
since 2000, including Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, West Virginia. See infra Appendix A.
62 Joint and Several Liability, supra note 37.
63 Id.
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the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s percentage of fault; and (4)
permit some type of reallocation in the event a tortfeasor is una-
ble to pay its proportionate share of the judgment. It also pro-
vides notes giving further detail about the particular aspects of
the states’ rules.
However, there are more variables than would fit in Appendix
A. Section III.F provides a generalized discussion of these vari-
ables, which, in some states, address allocation rules concerning
different tortfeasors, including those who (1) are immune from
several liability, (2) have settled, (3) committed an intentional
tort, as well as those subject to strict liability, and (4) are uniden-
tified, such as the hit-and-run driver in a motor vehicle accident.
Time and space prevented their state-by-state inclusion in the
chart. Still, any of these variables could be extremely important
in a particular case and should be researched if the issue is likely
to be significant. It is worth noting that these charts, like their
predecessors, are likely to become obsolete because state law
may continue to change as time passes.
B. THE EFFECT OF THE NARROWING OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Personal jurisdiction is the other issue that has increased the
filing of multiple actions. The Supreme Court recognized that
the standards for general and specific jurisdiction were ambigu-
ous and rendered a series of decisions over the past decade that
clarified many of the ambiguities.64 As the Court’s decisions
have helped clarify the law on personal jurisdiction, they have
also increased the likelihood of filing multiple lawsuits in multi-
ple venues for the same claim.65
64 E.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (“The rules and standards for determining when a State does or does
not have jurisdiction over an absent party have been unclear because of decades-
old questions left open in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court. of Cal., Solano
Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 107 . . . (1987).”); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134
(2014) (“This Court has not yet addressed whether a foreign corporation may be
subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-state
subsidiary.”).
65 This Article is not intended to express any opinion about the merits of the
Court’s decisions concerning personal jurisdiction. Rather, the focus here is
solely upon a specific issue that arises now as a consequence of those decisions in
conjunction with state several liability laws.
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1. General Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court first recognized the distinction between
specific and general jurisdiction in the mid-1980s66 based on a
Harvard Law Review article written by two distinguished schol-
ars.67 One of the cases of that era, Helicopteros Nacionales, de-
scribed the claim as one based on general jurisdiction, and the
Court rejected it on that basis without clearly articulating the
applicable criteria.68
Starting in 2011, the Court articulated more specific criteria
for general jurisdiction. A trilogy of cases limited general juris-
diction almost entirely to the state where a company was incor-
porated and where its principal place of business is located, i.e.,
where it is “at home.”69 Each of these decisions (and others in-
volving specific jurisdiction) reversed lower courts that had up-
held personal jurisdiction.70 As one article explained, the Court
has “redefined the landscape of personal jurisdiction and venue
over the past several years to limit where civil litigation can be
filed against businesses and other defendants with operations in
multiple states.”71
The Court’s requirement is often a benefit to defendants, but
not necessarily so, especially for large companies “at home” in
plaintiff-friendly locations. For example, Boeing’s repeated and
frequently unsuccessful efforts to remove cases from state court
or out of town altogether since moving its headquarters to
Chicago.72
66 E.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
nn.8–9 (1984); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 473
n.15 (1985).
67 Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
68 Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 418–19; see also Lea Brilmayer, Jennifer
Haverkamp & Buck Logan, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV.
721, 744 (1988) (“Although the Helicopteros Court clearly suggested that some
contacts count for general jurisdiction while others do not, the opinion itself
offers no explicit guidance for distinguishing between them.”).
69 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011);
Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 119; BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1554 (2017).
70 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 564 U.S. at 931, rev’g 681 S.E.2d 382 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2009); Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 142, rev’g 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011);
BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1560, rev’g 2016 MT 126, 383 Mont. 417, 373 P.3d 1
(Mont. 2016).
71 Goldberg, Appel & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 51.
72 See, e.g., Brokaw v. Boeing Co., 137 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1088 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
(removal by co-defendant remanded); Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726,
728 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Er v. Boeing Co., No. 10 C 6662, 2010 WL 4659547, at *1
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2. Specific Jurisdiction
For decades, the Court’s division over the criteria for personal
jurisdiction was especially problematic in product liability cases.
In the first such case, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the
Court’s opinion toyed with the concept of the “stream of com-
merce” in dicta but never explicitly accepted or rejected it or
defined its limitations.73 World-Wide Volkswagen predated the
Court’s articulation of general and specific jurisdiction. The
closest the Court came to accepting a “stream of commerce”
theory was in a concurring opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court of California,74 but the majority of the Court did
not accept this theory.75 As a result, the lower courts split, some
recognizing a liberal stream of commerce version of personal
jurisdiction and others requiring something more.76 Neither
World-Wide Volkswagen nor Asahi addressed a claim by an injured
consumer against a manufacturer. The former involved a claim
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Koral v. Boeing Co., 628 F.3d 945 (7th Cir.
2011); Nolan L. Grp. v. Boeing Co., No. 09 C 8056, 2010 WL 1253970, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 24, 2010); Saavedra v. Boeing Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 770, 770 (N.D. Ill.
2006); Lie v. Boeing Co., 311 F. Supp. 2d 725, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Torrez v.
Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., No. 13 C 825, 2013 WL 5325454, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
18, 2013); Jinhua Yang v. Boeing Co., No. 13 C 6846, 2013 WL 6633075, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2013), rev’d sub nom. Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co., 792 F.3d 805
(7th Cir. 2015); Bennett v. S.W. Airlines Co., 493 F.3d 762, 763 (7th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam) (removal by co-defendant, Southwest Airlines); Alemayehu v. Boe-
ing Co., No. 10 C 3147, 2010 WL 3328278, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2010); Saba-
tino v. Boeing Corp., No. 09 C 1551, 2009 WL 1635670, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 5,
2009); Glein v. Boeing Co., No. 10-452, 2010 WL 2608284, at *1 (S.D. Ill. June 25,
2010); Wong ex rel. Leung Yuen Man v. Boeing Co., No. 02 C 7865, 2003 WL
22078379, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2003); Katonah v. USAir, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 984,
985 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Bennett v. S.W. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 912 (7th Cir.
2007).
73 Id. at 297–98.
74 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
75 See id. at 104 (“O’CONNOR, J., announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part I, the opinion
of the Court with respect to Part II-B, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BREN-
NAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined,
and an opinion with respect to Parts II-A and III, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,
and POWELL and SCALIA, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, and
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 480 U. S. 116. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which WHITE and
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 480 U. S. 121.”).
76 Compare Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610,
613–15 (8th Cir. 1994) (adopting Justice Brennan’s stream-of-commerce test),
with Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N The Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 479–80 (6th
Cir. 2003) (adopting Justice O’Connor’s “stream of commerce ‘plus’” test).
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brought by an injured consumer against a regional distributor;77
the latter involved an indemnity claim between two foreign man-
ufacturers after settling with the plaintiff.78
Nearly a quarter-century after the Asahi stalemate, the Court
granted certiorari in a conventional product liability case, J. Mc-
Intyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.79 The Court’s plurality in J. Mc-
Intyre explicitly acknowledged the stalemate in Asahi, stating that
the rules and standards for determining state jurisdiction over
an absent party “have been unclear because of decades-old ques-
tions left open in Asahi . . . .”80 The lack of clarity arising from
Asahi, for the most part, resulted from its statement of the rela-
tion between jurisdiction and the “stream of commerce.”81 The
Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court and held that the
state court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.82
But the Court again failed to produce a majority opinion.83 “The
academic community met the Nicastro decision with almost
unanimous disapproval, decrying the Court’s inability to resolve
the stream of commerce theory in particular and to articulate a
coherent theory of personal jurisdiction in general.”84
Things have changed dramatically since that time. From 2011
to 2020, and after leaving personal jurisdiction “largely un-
77 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 288.
78 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 106.
79 564 U.S. 873, 877–78 (2011) (plurality opinion).
80 Id. at 877.
81 Id. at 881.
82 Id. at 887.
83 See id. at 876 (“Justice KENNEDY announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice SCALIA, and Jus-
tice THOMAS join.”).
84 Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness
Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867, 868, 868 n.3 (2012)
(emphasis added) (citing Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear,
and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245
(2011) (“The Supreme Court performed miserably. Its opinion in J. McIntyre . . .
is a disaster.”)); Allan Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Deci-
sion in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 344–46,
358–62, 367–69, 386–87 (2012) (The opinions “exacerbated rather than amelio-
rated the doctrinal confusion.”); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum
Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 241–42 (2011)
(“[T]he cases may serve to increase the confusion of the lower courts about the
requirements for establishing both general and specific jurisdiction.”); Adam N.
Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machin-
ery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 515 (2012) (calling the “lack of a major-
ity opinion” in Nicastro “disappointing”)).
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changed for almost seventy years,”85 the Court reviewed six such
cases, cases which some critics complain “significantly narrowed
general and specific jurisdiction,”86 constituted a “stealth revolu-
tion” that is “changing the shape of litigation,”87 and “dramati-
cally changed the law.”88
In each such recent case, the Court reversed lower courts’
general and specific personal jurisdiction assertions.89 The
Court appears to have signaled its narrowing of the standards
for specific jurisdiction by recharacterizing it as “case-linked” ju-
risdiction.90 As it recently stated in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Supe-
rior Court of California, case-linked jurisdiction “is confined to
adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very
controversy that establishes jurisdiction.”91 Absent such a con-
nection, “specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent
of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.”92
However, on March 25, 2021, the Court rendered a decision
to uphold personal jurisdiction.93 It is notable because the
Court had not decided a personal jurisdiction case for the plain-
tiff for over two decades. The Court decided two cases, on ap-
peals from the state courts in Montana and Minnesota, with
similar facts. In both cases, a car was sold in a different state and
subsequently re-sold to someone who brought it to the forum
jurisdiction where the injury-causing accident occurred.94 Ford
argued that the forum had no jurisdiction over it because Ford
85 Goldberg, Appel & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 52.
86 Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 58.
87 Hoffheimer, supra note 17, at 501, 505.
88 Michael Vitiello, Reflections on Hoffheimer’s The Stealth Revolution in Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. F. 31, 31 (2018).
89 See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1560 (2017), rev’g 2016 MT 126,
383 Mont. 417, 373 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2016); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of
Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017), rev’g 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016); Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277, 282 (2014), rev’g 688 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2012); Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 142 (2014), rev’g 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011).
90 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
91 137 S. Ct. at 1780. There is uncertainty as to whether the Court’s phrase,
“adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy
that establishes jurisdiction,” was intended to clarify, if not alter, the Court’s ear-
lier phrase, that required a showing that the claim “arise[s] out of or relate[s]
to,” activities in or directed at the forum. Compare Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780,
with Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985) (citing
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
92 Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
93 Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1032 (2021).
94 Id. at 1023.
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had not designed, manufactured, or sold the specific car at issue
in the forum jurisdiction.95
The Court repeatedly highlighted Ford’s ubiquitous contacts
with the forum states, including voluminous sales of the very
models of vehicles at issue in the respective cases.96 The Court
recounted that “Ford had systematically served a market in [the
forum states] for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege mal-
functioned and injured them in those States.”97 The fact that
Ford had sold the same models of the vehicles at issue many
times in the forum states was a consistent drumbeat throughout
the opinion.98 The Court strongly implied that the opinion was
limited to the facts before the Court.99 Time will tell whether
and to what degree lower courts will apply this decision.
Overall, the tightening of jurisdictional standards in cases in-
volving multiple defendants acting in different states increases
the probability that some defendants will successfully challenge
personal jurisdiction. Likewise, it increases the likelihood that
plaintiffs will file multiple complaints in multiple courts to pre-
serve their claims against all defendants, even if some defend-
ants are not subject to suit in the same forum as the rest.
III. SURVIVING THE NEW WORLD
This new environment requires litigators to adjust how they
handle cases with multiple defendants based in multiple states.
This Article discusses some of their options below.
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., id. at 1022–23, 1028.
97 Id. at 1028 (emphasis added).
98 Id. at 1022 (“Ford did substantial business in the State—among other things,
advertising, selling, and servicing the model of vehicle the suit claims is defec-
tive.”); see also id. at 1024, 1027–28, 1030, 1032.
99 Id. at 1022 (“[A] state court held that it had jurisdiction over Ford Motor
Company in a products-liability suit stemming from a car accident. The accident
happened in the State where suit was brought. The victim was one of the State’s
residents. And Ford did substantial business in the State—among other things,
advertising, selling, and servicing the model of vehicle the suit claims is defective.
Still, Ford contends that jurisdiction is improper because the particular car in-
volved in the crash was not first sold in the forum State, nor was it designed or
manufactured there. We reject that argument. When a company like Ford serves a
market for a product in a State and that product causes injury in the State to one of its
residents, the State’s courts may entertain the resulting suit.”) (emphasis added); see also
id. at 1028 (“Contrast a case, which we do not address, in which Ford marketed
the models in only a different State or region.”).
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A. SUE WHO?
The Restatement suggests that:
[t]here is much attraction to the basic proposition that a plaintiff
should sue all responsible tortfeasors in a single suit and that de-
fendants should join all other parties they claim to be liable in
some respect for the plaintiff’s injuries. Allocating responsibility
once for an indivisible injury suffered by the plaintiff, in a single
proceeding involving all responsible parties, has the advantage of
efficiency and avoiding administrative difficulties involved in
multiple assessments of responsibility for the same injury.100
The rise of several liability increases the risk that a plaintiff
who sues only one of the multiple potential defendants could
have her recovery reduced by the negligence of non-parties. But
the tightening of personal jurisdiction means that if the plaintiff
drags more defendants into one court, the likelihood increases
that one or more of the defendants will challenge personal juris-
diction—and prevail. The Restatement’s comments predate the
Supreme Court’s clarifications of the standards for personal ju-
risdiction, which make it more difficult to join all responsible
parties in one forum.
These standards pose challenges for defendants, too. Defend-
ants need to consider which other parties should be added and
whether the venue permits allocation to non-parties or limits al-
location to parties. Moreover, adding defendants may increase
the likelihood that some new parties may hurt more than help
in the trial. In any event, parties needs to consider how the addi-
tional parties are likely to affect the allocation of fault, whether
local law has deadlines for either adding third parties or identi-
fying and disclosing non-party tortfeasors, and other variables.101
B. HOW MANY LAWSUITS?
Why should a plaintiff file multiple lawsuits, arising from the
same accident in multiple venues? A justification is to prevent a
substantial percentage of the fault from being assigned to non-
100 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 10 cmt. f (AM. L.
INST. 2000) (citing cases in which courts have held that “a plaintiff who had previ-
ously sued and recovered from one defendant could not sue another defendant
for the same accident and injuries that were involved in the first suit”); see also
David C. Zuckerbrot, Mandatory Joinder of Parties: The Wave of the Future?, 43
RUTGERS L. REV. 53, 61–62 (1990) (explaining some of the strategical reasons
that bear on a claimant’s decision whether to join additional potentially liable
parties)).
101 See infra Appendix A.
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parties and thus reduce the plaintiff’s recovery. As a result, de-
fendants who do not have a basis for contesting personal juris-
diction may also have a problem if state law does not allow them
to allocate fault to non-parties. However, if a plaintiff is deciding
whether to file multiple lawsuits or a defendant is deciding
whether to challenge jurisdiction or add third-party defendants,
it is imperative to identify the critical target defendants and de-
termine where they are subject to personal jurisdiction as early
as possible. What are the pros and cons of one defendant seek-
ing and obtaining dismissal of the lawsuit in State A while de-
fending itself in State B?102 It is crucial to consider (1) the
applicable statutes of limitations; (2) statutes of repose; (3)
which states’ statutes toll the statute of limitations or give addi-
tional time if a defendant is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction;
and (4) the practical differences in the several and joint and
several rules in each actual or potential forum.
The chart in Appendix A and figures in Appendix B provide
current information about the principal allocation rules of each
state. In addition, Section III.F below identifies additional vari-
ables that plaintiffs and defendants should consider. Any one of
these issues may be significant to a plaintiff or a defendant in a
particular case.
C. SOME OF THE POTHOLES
There are various ways multiple lawsuits can produce unin-
tended consequences and, in some situations, significant re-
wards. Unfortunately, many of these are difficult to predict until
after the plaintiff has filed multiple complaints or one or more
defendants have sought or obtained a dismissal from the first
lawsuit. In any event, a plaintiff’s decision whether to file multi-
ple lawsuits, or a defendant’s antidote of seeking a dismissal for
lack of personal jurisdiction, is a critical decision, and counsel
should consider—and reconsider—the possible options and
their consequences. Although this Article does not discuss all
variables, hopefully, those summarized by state in Appendix A,
and those discussed generally in Section III.F below, will be a
good starting point and help identify other issues worth
consideration.
As discussed in Section III.D.2 below, the ideal way to avoid
the problems described in this Article is for the parties to agree
102 We could add States C and above, but the analysis provided here would
likely apply to those situations.
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upon a common forum that all parties can live with. If the par-
ties can agree on that objective, the related aspects of making
the selected forum work are relatively straightforward. One or
more of the alternative solutions discussed below might work in
some cases but, other than constructive collaboration, there
does not appear to be a one size fits all solution for all such
cases.
1. State-to-State Differences in Fault Allocation
When a party litigates the same case in multiple venues, some
venues will likely have adopted several liability, while others will
follow joint and several liability.103 Moreover, as described
above, venues A and B might both recognize several liability, but
the differences between them could be highly significant. In ad-
dition, one should not overlook the additional fact that States A
and B (and others) are likely to have differences on a wide
range of other legal issues aside from allocation of fault.104 It is
important to recognize the significant differences as part of the
plaintiff’s decision whether to file multiple lawsuits and the de-
fendant’s decision whether to challenge personal jurisdiction,
possibly identify non-parties, identify the state rules governing
whether their fault can be allocated, and, if so, the time limits
and procedures that dictate how it is done. These variables
should also help litigants decide whether they would rather liti-
gate in State A or State B. For example,
a. State A has pure several liability;105 State B does not allow
allocation to non-parties or settled parties.
Assume that a defendant is virtually certain to get a dismissal
from State A for lack of personal jurisdiction but is subject to
personal jurisdiction in State B. Should the defendant file the
motion? If successful, and the defendant ends up litigating in
103 See infra Appendix A (listing the states that retain joint and several liability).
Some of the several liability states also retain joint and several in particular cir-
cumstances. The footnotes should help the reader easily find the applicable law
in each state.
104 See infra Appendix C (providing a preliminary checklist of other issues to
consider when deciding whether it would be better to litigate in State A, B, or
elsewhere). Undoubtedly, there are additional issues that should be considered
in a given case.
105 “Pure several liability” is intended to describe state laws that allow allocation
to all persons or entities whose fault contributed to the injury, even if they are
immune to suit, have already settled, are not identified, are beyond the reach of
personal jurisdiction or otherwise.
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State B, they will probably be unable to allocate fault to the
other defendants in State A who settled or went to trial. The
defendant might get a setoff for whatever they paid; they might
not. But if all other defendants litigated or settled in State A, the
remaining defendant in state B could wind up liable for 100% of
the claim, despite what other defendants paid in State A.
• Same State A and B as above: If the defendant has no basis
for allocating fault to a non-party, the settling parties paid
significant amounts to settle, and State B allows a setoff for
prior settlements, State B might be very favorable to the
defendant.
• Another variant of the same example: Suppose a pilot or
the pilot’s estate brings a claim but loses in State A. The
jury decides that the pilot was 100% at fault. The defen-
dant in State B might obtain a dismissal based on res judi-
cata or collateral estoppel because, at least in some
jurisdictions, the plaintiff is bound by the result in the
State A trial.
• Conversely, if the jury in State A found that the non-party
defendant was 100% at fault, that defendant would probably
not be bound by such a judgment in State B because it was
rendered in a forum where that defendant was not a par-
ticipant. Courts are typically “bound by Hansberry v. Lee’s
famous maxim that ‘[i]t is a principle of general applica-
tion in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which
he is not designated as a party.’”106
Note that there are myriad variables like these, depending
upon the applicable states’ allocation rules,107 the specific cir-
cumstances of the particular case, and the status of the plaintiff
and the defendant(s) in the subsequent trials.
2. Appeals
What happens if someone appeals a decision in the first trial?
The appeal might involve important issues that affect the second
trial. What are the ramifications if the judgment in State A is
reversed on appeal? In any event, someone might ask the judge
in State B to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the
106 Alexandra Bursak, Note, Preclusions, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1651, 1653 (2016)
(citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 & n.7 (1979).
107 See infra Appendix A.
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appeal of a court in State A. The client who “succeeded” in ob-
taining a dismissal in State A—and perhaps might have done
well there—may well either have the case lingering in State B
for years or be forced to take it to trial before a final judgment is
rendered in State A. Even if the issue in State A is irrelevant to
the party sitting in State B, the delay could prevent the entry of a
final judgment and thereby adversely affect the proceeding in
State B.
3. The First Trial’s Effects on Subsequent Trials
Pursuing a claim in multiple lawsuits can backfire. There is a
risk of a party presenting testimony and arguments in the first
trial inconsistent with what that party submits in the second trial.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d)(3) entitles a party to make
separate claims or defenses regardless of inconsistency, subject
to the constraints of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.108 Fed-
eral courts have interpreted this rule to permit a party to make
allegations in a subsequent action inconsistent with the allega-
tions it made in the first.109
However, the right to allege inconsistent positions does not
insulate the party—or its witnesses—from being attacked in
front of the jury for doing so. “The inconsistent statements may
be evidentiary as admissions—convincing, persuasive or of little
weight, . . . but in and of themselves, they will not conclude a
party as a matter of law.”110 In some cases, judicial estoppel may
bar such inconsistent testimony in the subsequent proceeding
altogether. Judicial estoppel “prevents a party from asserting a
factual position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a posi-
tion previously taken by [that party] in a prior legal proceed-
ing.”111 The federal courts unanimously agree that judicial
estoppel applies if the prior assertion results in the court’s adop-
tion of that party’s position but are split as to whether a settle-
108 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(3); see FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
109 See, e.g., Peterson v. McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, 676 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir.
2012).
110 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1283 (3d ed. 2002) (quoting Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432,
438 (10th Cir. 1956)); see also Sheesley v. The Cessna Aircraft Co., No. Civ 02-
4185, 2006 WL 1084103, at *40 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006) (citing FED. R. EVID.
611(b), 801(d)).
111 Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2015)
(alteration in original) (quoting Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028,
1037 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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ment in the first proceeding is the “equivalent to winning a
judgment for purposes of applying judicial estoppel.”112
Other complications can arise if the parties fail to coordinate
their activities in the various cases early on. Ideally, the parties
should confer and develop a protocol to avoid unnecessary, du-
plicative discovery and how and whether documents and deposi-
tions in one forum, as well as product inspections, can be used
in the other forum. The parties must be aware of differences in
state procedures and rules (e.g., limits on the number or scope
of document requests or the length of depositions) and similar
issues. And they should also be aware that some discovery in one
venue might be irrelevant or even inappropriate in another.
Absent an agreed protocol, initiating discovery in all venues
could invite a defendant to move to stay discovery in a venue
where it is moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The court has discretion whether to permit jurisdictional discov-
ery and, in federal court, such a request for discovery can be
denied if the plaintiff has failed to “present factual allegations
that suggested with reasonable particularity the possible exis-
tence of the requisite minimum contacts.”113 Furthermore, a
court has discretion to stay consideration of a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction “to allow the parties additional
time to engage in discovery relevant to the jurisdictional issue
when there is some basis for believing that would be fruitful.”114
Jurisdictional discovery might properly be limited to the case in
which personal jurisdiction is at issue, because it may involve
sensitive financial or business information relevant only to per-
sonal jurisdiction. However, the parties also must be aware of
the risk that the courts where the subsequent cases are pending
may not wish to wait for the conclusion of the previous case(s),
let alone the additional delay if there are appeals.
112 Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Soczynski, 765 F.3d 931, 936 n.4 (8th Cir.
2014) (quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Loc. 343, 94 F.3d 597,
604–05 (9th Cir. 1996)); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Titan Tire Corp., 398 F.3d
879, 887 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a “favorable settlement . . . may be
sufficient to show that the party to be estopped prevailed in the prior case regard-
less of whether a judicial decision was obtained”).
113 Fatouros v. Lambrakis, 627 F. App’x 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Toys “R”
Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003)); see also Second
Amend. Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“To
get discovery, however, one must ask for it.”).
114 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1067.6 (4th ed. 2008).
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4. Time, Effort, and Costs
The cost of trying multiple trials over the same crash can be
extremely time-consuming and expensive for all parties. How-
ever, a plaintiff likely carries a greater burden than an insurer or
large company. Trying multiple trials may be the only way for a
plaintiff to obtain personal jurisdiction over every defendant.
But doing so can give rise to a variety of other problems. Adding
multiple defendants in the blind can be an unforced error un-
less it is necessary to avoid a statute of limitations or repose. Par-
ties can avoid wasting valuable time and expenses battling over
personal jurisdiction by conducting an early and thorough prod-
uct inspection to eliminate unnecessary parties. Early product
inspection can also help a plaintiff avoid unnecessary jurisdic-
tion motions brought by defendants who have no liability expo-
sure. It may be more difficult to motivate some defendants to
retain experts early and participate in inspections. Still, given
litigation costs, there are practical reasons to rule out unneces-
sary parties and establish a clear and legitimate basis for liability
against others.
D. CONSIDER FEDERAL COURT
Assuming diversity or a federal question exists, plaintiffs could
file, or defendants could remove, such cases to federal court.
Federal courts are better suited to handle multiparty disputes
and have tools to manage multiple lawsuits filed in multiple
states, such as multidistrict litigation and a generous venue stat-
ute.115 Most likely, the impediment is a lack of diversity or sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1407: Multidistrict Litigation (MDL)
28 U.S.C. § 1407 empowers the judicial panel on multidistrict
litigation (JPML) to transfer related cases to a single district for
pretrial proceedings or coordinate such cases.116 The multidis-
trict litigation (MDL) statute is designed to deal with “civil ac-
tions involving one or more common questions of fact [that] are
pending in different districts” by authorizing coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.117 The MDL statute is a tool
commonly used in airline disaster litigation but far less so in
smaller, general aviation cases. It can provide a method to liti-
115 28 U.S.C. §§ 1407(a)–(b), 1404(a).
116 Id. § 1407(a)–(b).
117 Id. § 1407(a).
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gate multiple cases in different federal courts arising from the
same claim. The MDL statute’s two biggest shortcomings are
that MDLs (1) are not designed to conduct trials and (2) can be
painfully slow.118
There can be other impediments to MDLs as well. If a movant
files a Section 1407 motion to “circumvent [the] obstacles of
personal jurisdiction,” such conduct is a “compelling reason for
denying the requested transfer.”119 Furthermore, the JPML
looks to see if alternate solutions can avoid the necessity for an
MDL transfer.120 For example, suitable alternatives to a Sec-
tion 1407 transfer are often available to minimize duplicative
discovery: Notices for a particular deposition can be served in
multiple pending actions, thereby making a deposition available
in each action; the parties can enter a stipulation that any dis-
covery relevant to more than one action may be used in all those
actions; and any party can seek orders from the various courts
directing the parties to coordinate their pretrial efforts.121 More-
over, the parties may seek stays of some of the actions pending
the outcome of another.122
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1404: Change of Venue Statute
The venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, provides an effective sub-
stitute for the need to pursue multiple lawsuits in multiple ve-
nues because it allows cases to be transferred “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of jus-
tice.”123 The statute permits a transfer to “any district or division
to which all parties have consented.”124 Moreover, once the
cases are transferred to one venue, the court has broad power to
“join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the ac-
118 See Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D.
Mass. 2006).
119 In re Highway Accident Near Rockville, Conn., on Dec. 30, 1972, 388 F.
Supp. 574, 576 (J.P.M.L. 1975); see also In re Klein, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1374
(J.P.M.L. 2013).
120 See Order Denying Transfer, MDL No. 2868 (2018).
121 In re Com. Lighting Prods., Inc. Cont. Litig., 415 F. Supp. 392, 393 (J.P.M.L.
1976).
122 In re Eli Lilly & Co. (Cephalexin Monohydrate) Pat. Litig., 446 F. Supp. 242,
244 (J.P.M.L. 1978).
123 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
124 Id.
406 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [86
tions[,]” or “consolidate the actions[,]” or “issue any other or-
ders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.”125
Personal jurisdiction, unlike subject matter jurisdiction,126 can
be waived.127 Consequently, if the parties want to try all the cases
in the same court, they can do so, even if that court does not
have personal jurisdiction over one or more parties.
Federal courts have employed both MDL assignment and
venue consolidation as tools used in the same case.128 After all,
the MDL process is solely designed for pretrial purposes, not to
try cases.129 While a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for pretrial
purposes “can streamline litigation, thereby benefitting the par-
ties and the courts, transfer under Section 1404(a) for all pur-
poses should be attempted, where appropriate.”130 As the JPML
stated, “Section 1404 transfer is typically advantageous because it
‘is for all purposes, including trial. For this reason, transfer
under Section 1404(a)—where appropriate—can result in a
more streamlined action, without the procedural necessity of re-
mand to the transferor court that is required under
Section 1407.’”131
Any venue transfer or MDL can and should be sought early in
the litigation. The JPML has rejected requests for MDL status
because “[t]he relatively advanced status of the [pending case]
also weighs against centralization.”132 The Federal Rules allow
litigants to raise the issue early in the lawsuit(s).133 Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(f) requires the parties to confer about
how the litigation should be handled.134 Although Rule 26(f)
conferences are often cursory and limited to scheduling, the
Federal Rules give the parties far more latitude. Indeed, the
Rule 26(f) conference ordinarily leads to a Rule 16 conference
125 Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1124 (2018) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
42(a)(1)–(3)).
126 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
127 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), (h)(1).
128 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill., on May 25, 1979, 476 F. Supp. 445,
450 (J.P.M.L. 1979).
129 Id. at 448.
130 In re Air Crash Over Hudson River Near N.Y.C., N.Y., on Aug. 8, 2009, 716
F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1360 (J.P.M.L. 2010); cf. In re Air Crash Near Islamabad, Pak.,
on July 28, 2010, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2011).
131 In re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2186, 2016 WL
2991150, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Apr. 7, 2016).
132 In re Helicopter Crash Near Savannah, Ga., on Jan. 15, 2014, 178 F. Supp.
3d 1372, 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2016).
133 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
134 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
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with the court,135 in which the court has considerable flexibility,
inter alia, for “adopting special procedures for managing poten-
tially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex
issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual
proof problems[.]”136 Agreeing to consolidate lawsuits into one
venue under Section 1404(a) does not obligate the transferee
court to apply its law to all cases filed elsewhere. Instead, “the
tranferee district court must be obligated to apply the state law




At first, one might assume that joining all potential defend-
ants in one federal court trial would be permissible via the sup-
plemental jurisdiction provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 added in
1990.138 After all, supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367
was intended to eliminate the confusion of various case-law con-
cepts, including pendent jurisdiction (or “pendent claim”),139
pendent-party jurisdiction,140 and ancillary jurisdiction.141 Con-
135 Id. 26(f)(3)(F), 26(f)(4).
136 Id. 16(c)(2)(L).
137 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); In re Takata Airbag Prods.
Liab. Litig., 24 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2021).
138 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
139 See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Pendent juris-
diction arises when the plaintiff asserts both a federal law claim and a state law
claim under the same facts, but in which the parties lack diversity.
140 Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“The situation with respect to
the joining of a new party, however, strikes us as being both factually and legally
different from the situation facing the Court in Gibbs and its predecessors. From
a purely factual point of view, it is one thing to authorize two parties, already
present in federal court by virtue of a case over which the court has jurisdiction,
to litigate in addition to their federal claim a state-law claim over which there is
no independent basis of federal jurisdiction. But it is quite another thing to per-
mit a plaintiff, who has asserted a claim against one defendant with respect to
which there is federal jurisdiction, to join an entirely different defendant on the
basis of a state-law claim over which there is no independent basis of federal
jurisdiction, simply because his claim against the first defendant and his claim
against the second defendant ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact.’”) (quoting United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 725), superseded by statute, 28
U.S.C. 1367, as recognized in Alexander by Alexander v. Goldome Credit Corp.,
772 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 n.8 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
141 Ancillary jurisdiction “encompassed only additional claims that were closely
related to the original action that conferred federal jurisdiction on the district
court. The defendant’s or third party’s claims had to be factually similar to and
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gress’s enactment of the statute in 1990 was in response to the
Supreme Court’s decision the previous year that rejected the
court-created doctrine of pendent-party jurisdiction.142 How-
ever, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) specifically precludes the use of sup-
plemental jurisdiction when subject matter jurisdiction is based
solely on diversity.143 For this reason, Section 1367(b) is not a
pathway to circumvent diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Still, it can be important and helpful when claims arise
out of a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
b. Joinder
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1)(A) requires joinder
if “in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete
relief among existing parties . . .”144 Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 19(a)(1)(B) requires joinder if the absent person “claims
an interest relating to the subject of the action” and their ab-
sence may “as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s
ability to protect the interest” or “leave an existing party subject
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations because of the interest.”145 In many
states, the jury might allocate fault to the non-party. Therefore,
a non-party’s absence could reduce the plaintiff’s recovery with-
out a binding judgment against the non-party. Conversely, in
states where the jury can only allocate fault to parties, the ab-
sence of the non-party could result in greater liability for de-
fendants, thereby undermining the objective of several liability
to limit each party to its percentage of responsibility. Superfi-
cially, one would think that Rule 19 would at least permit, and
logically dependent on the claims raised in plaintiff’s complaint.” Patrick D. Mur-
phy, A Federal Practitioner’s Guide to Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
78 MARQ. L. REV. 973, 978–79 (1995) (footnote omitted); see also Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978) (“It is not unreasonable to as-
sume that, in generally requiring complete diversity, Congress did not intend to
confine the jurisdiction of federal courts so inflexibly that they are unable to
protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit.
Those practical needs are the basis of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. But
neither the convenience of litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can
suffice to justify extension of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to a plaintiff’s
cause of action against a citizen of the same State in a diversity case.”).
142 Murphy, supra note 141, at 974, 1000; see also Darren J. Gold, Note, Supple-
mental Jurisdiction over Claims by Plaintiffs in Diversity Cases: Making Sense of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(b), 93 MICH. L. REV. 2133, 2145 (1995).
143 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(b), 1332.
144 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(A).
145 Id. 19(a)(1)(B).
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perhaps require, joinder of non-parties who should share the
risk of liability.
However, other provisions render Rule 19 unlikely to apply
for the same reasons as supplemental jurisdiction. Required
joinder is conditioned on the premise that the joinder “will not
deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . .”146 “If a
joined party objects to venue and the joinder would make venue
improper, the court must dismiss that party.”147
As mentioned previously, Section 1367 (the supplemental ju-
risdiction statute) also shuts the door to using joinder to circum-
vent diversity jurisdiction requirements.148 Section 1367
specifically precludes the use of any of the joinder rules if such
joinder would be inconsistent with the requirements of the di-
versity statute.149 So permissive joinder under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 20 will fail in cases where complete diversity is
lacking.
Nor do joinder rules circumvent personal jurisdiction. Even if
there is no diversity problem, limitations on personal jurisdic-
tion also limit joinder under Rule 19(b), based on the court’s
consideration of whether joinder of the party is not “feasible.”150
Courts have held that joinder is not feasible when the absentee
is not subject to personal jurisdiction.151
4. National Personal Jurisdiction . . . Maybe Someday . . .
While state courts do not have a mechanism to consolidate
related lawsuits in other states, it remains an open question
whether Congress could authorize federal courts to exercise na-
tional personal jurisdiction. The plurality opinion of the Su-
preme Court in J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro suggests that
Congress could empower federal district courts to handle cases
when no single state court can but in which one or more de-
146 Id. 19(a)(1).
147 Id. 19(a)(3).
148 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
149 See id. The statute also specifies Rules 14 and 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
150 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
151 EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2005) (first cit-
ing FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a); and then citing Tick v. Cohen, 787 F.2d 1490, 1493
(11th Cir. 1986)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Michigan, 11 F.3d 1341,
1345–46 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Local 670, United Rubber Workers v. Int’l
Union, 822 F.2d 613, 618 (6th Cir. 1897)); Maldonado-Viñas v. Nat’l W. Life Ins.
Co., 862 F.3d 118, 122–23 (1st Cir. 2017); see also 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
110, § 1607.
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fendants has a national presence.152 The rationale was that the
due process limitations on state courts arise from the Four-
teenth Amendment,153 whereas due process limitations on fed-
eral courts arise from the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.154 The Court’s plurality opinion states:
It may be that, assuming it were otherwise empowered to legislate
on the subject, the Congress could authorize the exercise of juris-
diction in appropriate courts. That circumstance is not presented
in this case, however, and it is neither necessary nor appropriate
to address here any constitutional concerns that might be attend-
ant to that exercise of power. . . . Nor is it necessary to determine
what substantive law might apply were Congress to authorize ju-
risdiction in a federal court in New Jersey. . . . (“The issue is
personal jurisdiction, not choice of law”). A sovereign’s legisla-
tive authority to regulate conduct may present considerations dif-
ferent from those presented by its authority to subject a
defendant to judgment in its courts. Here the question concerns
the authority of a New Jersey state court to exercise jurisdiction,
so it is petitioner’s purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not with
the United States, that alone are relevant.155
Academia has debated whether the Fifth Amendment permits
Congress—or even the courts—to authorize national personal
jurisdiction over defendants with significant contacts with the
United States as a whole.156 At present, this is an unlikely option
for a litigant in the absence of additional congressional action.
However, there are a few situations in which the courts can ap-
ply national personal jurisdiction under existing law.157 In addi-
tion, other possible avenues should be considered as possible
means to join all defendants in a single proceeding for purposes
of several liability, such as supplemental jurisdiction158 and the
joinder rules.159 However, at present, each of these procedures
152 564 U.S. 873, 885–86 (2011) (plurality opinion).
153 See id. at 873–74.
154 See id. at 884.
155 Id. at 885–86 (citations omitted).
156 E.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction, 68 EMORY L.J. 509,
525 (2019); Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(K)(2): A
Way to (Partially) Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 413, 417
(2017) (“Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, most lower
courts and other authorities are of the opinion that some variant of the ‘national
contacts’ test applies to cases under the Fifth Amendment.”).
157 Nash, supra note 156, at 534.
158 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
159 FED. R. CIV. P. 19–20.
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has limitations that are likely to preclude them as a simple
solution.
It has been over a decade since the Nicastro plurality suggested
national jurisdiction, and Congress has yet to accept the
invitation.
E. DEFENDANT’S OPTIONS
Defendants have options for countering multiple lawsuits
brought on behalf of the same plaintiff.
1. Move to Dismiss Duplicative Lawsuits
If a plaintiff files multiple lawsuits against the same parties in
multiple courts, can the defendant dismiss all but one of them
for reasons other than lack of personal jurisdiction? Even if the
defendants could obtain dismissals, should they?
At common law, a party could file a plea of abatement to ob-
ject to duplicative complaints.160 Courts have the power to dis-
miss or stay a lawsuit because another action is pending.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not include
multiple lawsuits as a basis for dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(1), federal courts have the authority to use
their discretion to consider abatement of the duplicative
claims.161 In an environment where defendants have a stronger
basis to challenge personal jurisdiction, one would assume that
the filing of multiple lawsuits when facing jurisdictional chal-
lenges and several liability issues would dissuade most judges
from dismissing multiple lawsuits filed for those reasons.
There is a split of authority about whether a plaintiff can
bring multiple actions arising from the same accident. In 1995,
John Scott Hickman wrote an article thoroughly addressing the
subject and opining that courts should limit litigants to one ac-
tion to determine the percentages of fault in the absence of
joint and several liability.162 He cited various cases that preclude
multiple actions based upon the entire controversy doctrine,
collateral estoppel, and statutory interpretation mandating a
160 See, e.g., P. H. Vartanian, Annotation, Stay of Civil Proceedings Pending Determi-
nation of Action in Another State or Country, 19 A.L.R. 2d 301 § 1 (1951).
161 See, e.g., 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 110, § 1360, n.11 (citing Int’l
Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of Am. v. Angoff, 58 F.3d 1266 (8th Cir. 1995)); Ellison
Framing, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1012 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
162 Hickman, supra note 10, passim.
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one-action rule.163 Other courts have rendered contrary deci-
sions, for example, by reasoning that the second action was not
barred because it was brought against a different defendant or
raised issues not included in the first lawsuit.164
Hickman advocated a rule that would require all defendants
to be involved in a single trial to serve the goals of “efficiency,
fairness, and consistency of judgments in comparative fault juris-
dictions.”165 His practical solution, offered in 1995, may not be
achievable today in light of current personal jurisdiction stan-
dards. Short of a disaster that spawns an MDL proceeding, or
reliance on the venue statute discussed above,166 a rule that
would require all defendants to be in a single trial appears to be
the only mechanism to consolidate lawsuits pending in multiple
states and try them together. Using federal court for this pur-
pose depends upon whether there is subject-matter jurisdiction
over the parties and a willingness of the parties to litigate in fed-
eral court.
Even though the tightening of personal jurisdiction standards
is likely to encourage defendants to contest personal jurisdiction
in each forum, is it worthwhile to do so? For some defendants,
definitely so. For example, a defendant with limited resources or
one whose liability is minimal or nonexistent should usually
challenge personal jurisdiction if they can. But other defendants
should be more cautious. There are two primary shortcomings
to winning a motion to dismiss duplicative lawsuits: (1) that, de-
spite multiple lawsuits, none would have all parties present; and
(2) although clients invariably appreciate a defense lawyer who
obtains early dismissals from lawsuits, dismissals based on per-
sonal jurisdiction do not automatically get the client off the
hook. A dismissal based on personal jurisdiction, by definition,
is without prejudice.167
Consequently, before challenging personal jurisdiction, a de-
fendant should consider: (1) whether the motion, if granted,
will result in the end of the case for that defendant or simply
give rise to litigation in another forum; and (2) whether the al-
ternate venues are likely to be better or worse than where the
present lawsuit was filed. For example, the courts where the de-
163 Id. at 753–58.
164 Id. at 759–61.
165 Id. at 762.
166 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
167 E.g., Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1216–17 (10th Cir.
2002); Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1221 (11th Cir. 1999).
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fendant is “at home” may be more troublesome than the court
where the lawsuits are filed.168 The cost of challenging personal
jurisdiction may include far more than the motion papers and
oral argument. The plaintiff may seek jurisdictional discovery,
which could be expensive and time-consuming, either in pro-
ducing voluminous and sensitive commercial information or fil-
ing additional motions objecting to the scope of the discovery
sought. Consequently, obtaining dismissals in four out of five
lawsuits may ultimately cost more than not challenging at all.
Furthermore, although Congress and the Supreme Court
have limited the avenues for personal jurisdiction, some lower
courts seem more reluctant to toss aside precedent that predates
and are inconsistent with the Court’s recent decisions.169 There-
fore, in deciding to dismiss a case based on personal jurisdic-
tion, it is essential to consider the potential time and cost of
appeals and the risk that, at the end of the appellate process, the
client may still have to endure the cost of litigating the merits of
the case.
168 Consider Boeing, which is now “at home” in Chicago, which has long been
identified by the ATRA as a “judicial hellhole.” See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND.,
Judicial Hellholes 2010/2011 (2010), https://www.judicialhellholes.org/cook-
county-illinois_2010-11/ [perma.cc/BS4U-8K8J]. Although it can attempt to es-
cape via forum non conveniens, Boeing should have no basis to challenge per-
sonal jurisdiction in its “home.”
169 Compare, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2019 MT 115, ¶
21, 395 Mont. 478, 443 P.3d 407 (Mont. 2019), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) (find-
ing jurisdiction over Ford involving a vehicle that was sold in Washington, resold
ten years later and registered in Montana) (“Where a company first designed,
manufactured, or sold a vehicle is immaterial to the personal jurisdiction in-
quiry . . . ), and Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 753 (Minn. 2019),
aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) (Ford “argues that ‘[n]o part of Ford’s allegedly
tortious conduct—designing, manufacturing, warrantying, or warning about the
1994 Crown Victoria—occurred in Minnesota.’ Those contacts are only those
that cause the claim, though. As we explained above, the requirements of due
process are met so long as Ford’s contacts relate to the claim.”) (alteration in
original), with Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 347 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1350 (N.D. Ga.
2018) (“Ford’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts within [Georgia] is not enough
to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to
that activity.’”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted), and Pitts v. Ford Motor
Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d 676, 686 (S.D. Miss. 2015) (finding no specific personal
jurisdiction over Ford in Mississippi where the plaintiffs purchased their vehicle
in Texas and crashed in Mississippi because there was no “meaningful connec-
tion” between the claims and Ford’s Mississippi contacts).
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2. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel
A defendant’s victory in the first trial may give rise to res judi-
cata or collateral estoppel challenges against the plaintiff in the
second trial.170 However, a plaintiff’s victory in the first trial
would probably not justify res judicata or collateral estoppel in
the second trial against a defendant who was not a party in the
first.171
For example, suppose the plaintiff’s decedent was the pilot.
Plaintiff’s first trial is against the engine manufacturer, and the
second trial is against the fixed-base operator (FBO) who per-
formed maintenance on the engine. The forum permits the jury
verdict to assess the fault of non-parties as well as the parties.
The plaintiff alleges that an engine failure caused the crash. The
manufacturer argues that the crash was caused solely by pilot
error. Further, suppose that the first trial is exclusively against
the manufacturer because the court had granted the FBO’s mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The jury renders
a verdict for the manufacturer. Even though the verdict form
listed the FBO and the manufacturer, the jury found the pilot
100% at fault. In all likelihood, res judicata or collateral estop-
pel would probably result in a dismissal of the second trial be-
cause the first court found that the pilot was 100% at fault.172
Conversely, suppose under the same facts, the jury in the first
case concludes that the non-party FBO was 100% at fault. The
manufacturer has prevailed, but the plaintiff is unlikely to be
able to invoke res judicata or collateral estoppel over the FBO if
it was not a party to the trial.173
F. KNOWN UNKNOWNS OF SEVERAL LIABILITY LAWS
If multiple lawsuits are filed in multiple states that have
adopted several liability, the state laws are unlikely to be the
same. Any single difference may be extremely important in any
given case, as shown in the variations provided in Appendix A.
The most significant additional variations concern which catego-
ries of tortfeasors are subject to allocation of fault (e.g., whether
170 See discussion supra Section III.C.1.
171 See discussion supra Section III.C.1.
172 Cf. Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1323 (7th Cir. 1978) (National
Transportation Safety Board decision in enforcement hearing precluded plaintiff
from relitigating the issue of whether he violated the safety regulations by flying
his aircraft into known icing conditions, an issue that had been finally deter-
mined adversely to him in the administrative proceeding.).
173 See discussion supra Section III.C.1
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it includes those who are immune, who have settled, whose tor-
tious conduct was intentional, and who are unknown or uniden-
tified actors) and whether they must be added to the lawsuit as a
prerequisite to allocation. Not all these variations are in Appen-
dix A, so they are discussed below.
1. Immunity
Some, but not all, several liability state laws preclude alloca-
tion of fault to persons or entities who are immune from suit.
The most common immunity from suit arises from the exclusiv-
ity provision of most workers’ compensation statutes.174 Among
the other categories of immunity are “sovereign immunity, dip-
lomatic immunity, parental immunity, interspousal immunity,
charitable immunity, the immunity of government officials, and
the immunity of municipal corporations.”175
Moreover, there is ambiguity about what “immune” means in
this context. Some kinds of immunity, either by statute or com-
mon law, preclude liability even though the actor “may have
committed a tort, but by reason of a statutory or common law
designation based on public policy, the defendant cannot be
held liable for the tort.”176 Other kinds of immunity may be re-
garded as “nominal immunity.” For example, someone who
owed no duty or did not breach any existing duty might be re-
garded as having “nominal immunity.”177 In some states, such a
person may not have any allocable “share” of responsibility to
others.178 The Restatement’s “C” series “reflects the current ma-
jority rule in several-liability jurisdictions by stating that ‘the
plaintiff, each defendant, and each other identified person[ ]
whose tortious conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s dam-
ages for which several liability is imposed are submitted to the
fact finder for an assignment of a percentage of comparative re-
sponsibility.’ Thus, in the C series, the plaintiff bears the cost of
tortious insolvent or immune persons, and the defendant is
spared from liability in excess of its responsibility.”179
174 See, e.g., Ireland, supra note 46, at 822–24.
175 Cardi, supra note 29, at 1295.
176 Id. (footnote omitted).
177 Id. at 1296.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1308 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
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2. Settlements
If the plaintiff settled with one person and obtained a judg-
ment against another in traditional joint and several liability ju-
risdictions, there is typically no basis to compare their relative
fault.180 Instead, the judgment would be offset by the amount
the plaintiff already obtained in the settlement.181 But if a defen-
dant’s settlement seemed unfairly cheap, then things could get
messy. If A was 99% at fault but only had a $25,000 liability in-
surance policy and no other assets, defendant B, who was 1% at
fault, would have to pay the entire amount of damages and only
receive a credit for the $25,000 previously paid.182 This conun-
drum was a major reason states switched to several liability.183
Most several liability states—but not all—would only impose 1%
of the total damages on B (e.g., his proportionate share of the
fault). Not all states follow this pattern, so it is important to
know the rule in each forum. Moreover, if there is a difference
between the rule in the state where A settled and where B was
found to be 1% at fault, the parties may need to brief the
choice-of-law issue to determine which state’s allocation rules
apply. Furthermore, if a plaintiff has filed in multiple states, the
standards by which a settlement is approved may vary. Even if
the parties all agree where they want to see court approval, an-
other state’s law may also require its own approval. This is espe-
cially likely in cases involving minors and incapacitated persons,
either as parties or beneficiaries.184
180 WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIA-
BILITY 50-STATE SURVEY, 4 (2013), https://www.wilsonelser.com/writable/files/
Legal_Analysis/50_state-survey-joint-and-several-liability_mm4.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A7UC-BQNN].
181 See generally id.
182 Section 885(3) of the Second Restatement of Torts states that the non-set-
tling party is entitled to a credit for the payment of the settling tortfeasor. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 885(3) (AM. L. INST. 1979). This provision
was replaced by § 16 of the Third Restatement of Torts, which suggests a “com-
parative share” rule, in which the allocation to the settling party is based on the
factfinder’s percentages of comparative fault rather than the amount of the set-
tlement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 16 (AM. L.
INST. 2000).
183 See generally James J. Scheske, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Theory: A
Survey of State Approaches, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 627 (1988).
184 For example, the State of Washington requires approval of such settlements
in every settlement of such a claim, whether filed in court or not, and, if a claim
was filed in court, requires a hearing in that county to approve the settlement.
Wash. Super. Ct. Spec. P. R. 98.16W(a).
2021] CLAIM SPLITTING IN THE NEW WORLD 417
Although several liability statutes are generally assumed to
favor defendants, plaintiffs can use several liability to their ad-
vantage too. For example, unlike joint and several jurisdictions,
most several liability states have replaced the traditional rule
that allowed non-settling parties to offset money the plaintiff ob-
tained from prior settlements and protect non-settling parties by
ensuring that they will only be held liable for their percentage
of fault.185 If the plaintiff can pick off defendants, one by one, it
may be possible to recover more than 100% of the value of the
claim because there are no setoffs.186 The plaintiff has to per-
suade multiple defendants that their percentage of exposure is
greater than they think. As more defendants settle out, those
remaining defendants receive no offset and may pay more be-
cause they risk exposure to the entire verdict. However, if four
defendants are each persuaded to settle for 50% of the likely
verdict, several liability works to the plaintiff’s benefit.
Typically, states with joint and several liability may mitigate
the all-or-nothing consequences via contribution statutes or
common law indemnity. By contrast, those remedies are some-
times eliminated or rendered irrelevant in several liability
jurisdictions.187
3. Intentional and Strict Liability Tortfeasors
Most several liability states exclude allocation of the fault of
intentional tortfeasors, and a smaller number exclude strict lia-
bility.188 However, a “growing minority of states” now permit the
finder of fact to consider all misdeeds of other parties and non-
parties on the rationale that doing so “ensure[s] that no
party . . . pay[s] more than its ‘fair share’ of the fault.”189 Exclud-
ing intentional misconduct makes little sense because it pro-
vides more protection for those guilty of deliberate misconduct
185 WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP, supra note 180, at 3.
186 E.g., Petrolane Inc. v. Robles, 154 P.3d 1014, 1019–20 (Alaska 2007)
(“[T]he rule against double recovery is grounded in joint and several liability.”).
187 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 23 cmt. f (AM.
L. INST. 2000); see also Lasley v. Combined Transp., Inc., 261 P.3d 1215, 1227 (Or.
2011) (en banc) (contribution statutes still remain but “circumstances in which a
defendant will pay more than its proportional share and, therefore, have a reason
to seek contribution from a codefendant will be quite limited”). Also, “a com-
mon-law indemnity claim is inconsistent with that statutory scheme and is not
justified.” Eclectic Inv., LLC v. Patterson, 354 P.3d 678, 680 (Or. 2015) (en banc).
188 Ellen M. Bublick, The End Game of Tort Reform: Comparative Apportionment and
Intentional Torts, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 355, 372 n.59 (2003).
189 Id. at 370–71, 379.
418 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [86
than inadvertent errors.190 Likewise, it makes little sense to re-
fuse to allow a product manufacturer to allocate fault to a third
party’s negligence if the basis of the manufacturer’s liability is
strict liability, whose liability is therefore not based on negligent
conduct at all.
4. Unknown and Unidentifiable Actors
Consider hit and run auto collisions, or imagine an aircraft is
severely damaged overnight by persons unknown while parked
at a remote, privately owned airport. An investigation fails to
identify the perpetrator. If the airport was negligent, the air-
plane owner could recover the entire damages from the airport
in a joint and several liability state. In a several liability state, the
answer varies from state to state. One state might permit the
fault of everyone to be considered, including the unidentified
culprit, or it might limit the allocation to parties—including
those added by the defendant—in which case the airport owner
would not be able to reduce its liability by allocating to the van-
dals. Or, the state law might allow the defendant to find and
name other tortfeasors and then give the plaintiff a prescribed
period to amend and add and serve those parties.191
IV. THE RECOMMENDED SOLUTION: NEGOTIATE A
FORUM ALL PARTIES CAN ACCEPT
It behooves plaintiffs and defendants alike to try to agree
upon a common forum, if possible. As pointed out above, if the
lawsuits are filed in federal courts, an agreement among the par-
ties empowers the judge(s) to transfer the cases to a single
venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, so that the cases themselves
can be consolidated for a single trial. Understandably, it may be
difficult to reach a consensus, and one contrarian can sabotage
a constructive solution. Defendants might view the plaintiffs’ fa-
vorite forum choice as a “judicial hellhole” in which defendants
fear that they won’t get a fair trial. Conversely, plaintiffs might
190 See id. at 359–60 (discussing Brandon v. Cnty. of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d
604 (Neb. 2000)); see also, e.g., Shin v. Sunriver Prep. Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762, 778
(Or. Ct. App. 2005) (in which the court interpreted the state’s comparative fault
statute to preclude intentional fault. It thereby held a negligent boarding school
100% at fault for the sexual assault of a female student by her father, who visited
her despite knowledge of his prior sexual abuse of his daughter).
191 In addition, some several liability states might permit allocation to nonpar-
ties but disallow allocation to a tortfeasor w hose misconduct was intentional. See
discussion supra Section III.F.3.
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believe that the defendants’ preferred forum could be one in
which no plaintiff has a chance. If the parties cannot reach a
consensus, they might consider mediating that narrow issue.192
Litigators and judges need to understand where we are in or-
der to succeed in this environment. The dangers of overlooking
the differences in allocation rules from state to state, which dif-
ferences make a real difference in a particular case, how to
avoid the surprises that could drastically alter a plaintiff’s recov-
ery or a defendant’s exposure, and what options are available
and whether they work to the client’s benefit.
192 In addition to trying to agree upon a forum for all parties, they might also
address other related issues, such as: (1) dismissal of all other lawsuits pending
elsewhere (and no others to be filed); (2) an early deadline for adding new par-
ties; (3) dropping any motions to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction, service
of process and similar issues; (4) coordination of discovery and scheduling
among all pending cases; and (5) consider whether to try for a consensus as to
choice of law.
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APPENDIX A
Strict Reallocation
Pure Non-Parties’ Product Fault Per- Allowed if
Joint & Fault Liability centage Portion
State Several Several Included Excluded Threshold Uncollectable
Alabama X193
Alaska194 X195
Arizona X196 Yes197 No
Arkansas X198 Yes199 No200
California X201 Yes202
Colorado X203 Yes204
193 Nelson Brothers, Inc. v. Busby, 513 So. 2d 1015, 1017 (Ala. 1987).
194 Allocation “to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, person who
has been released from liability, or other person responsible for the damages
unless the person was identified as a potentially responsible person, the person is
not a person protected from a civil action under AS 09.10.055 . . . .” ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.17.080(a)(2) (2021). Non-parties are “parties [that] had a sufficient oppor-
tunity to join that person in the action but chose not to . . . .” Id.
195 Id. § 09.17.080(d); Sowinski v. Walker, 198 P.3d 1134, 1149–50 (Alaska
2008).
196 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(A) (2021); Young v. Beck, 251 P.3d 380,
383 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc).
197 Including the fault of employers. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Leija, 422 P.3d
1033, 1036 (Ariz. 2018). Fault can be allocated to settled parties and anyone at
fault “regardless of whether the person was, or could have been, named as a party
to the suit.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(B).
198 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-201(a)–(b) (2021); Corn v. Farmers Ins. Co., 430
S.W.3d 655, 659 (Ark. 2013).
199 Includes fault of all persons or entities. Johnson v. Rockwell Automation,
Inc., 308 S.W.3d 135, 140 (Ark. 2009) (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-202(a)).
200 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-101.
201 Joint and several liability solely for economic damages, and several liability
for non-economic damages. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West 2021). “Nothing
contained in this measure is intended, in any way, to alter the law of immunity.”
Id. § 1431.3.
202 Split of authority on whether and when joint and several liability still ap-
plies to strict liability claims. Compare Romine v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 169 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 208, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (“[C]ourts held that Proposition 51 does
not apply in a strict products liability action when a single defective product pro-
duced a single injury to the plaintiff. That is, all the defendants in the stream of
commerce of that single product remain jointly and severally liable.”), with
Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 82, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (“The
repeated judicial application of the term ‘comparative fault’ to claims and pro-
ceedings involving strict products liability strongly suggests, if it does not prove,
that the voters intended the term [in Proposition 51] (or must be deemed to
have intended it) to encompass such claims.”) (alteration in original).
203 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5(1) (2021).
204 Ninety days for the plaintiff to add non-party after the defendant gives no-
tice of non-party fault. Id. § 13-21-111.5(3)(b); Redden v. SCI Colo. Funeral
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Connecticut X205 Yes206 X207
Delaware X208
D.C. X209







Servs., Inc., 38 P.3d 75, 80 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-111.5(3)(b)).
205 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(c) (2021).
206 Applies only to negligence claims, and not strict liability claims. Roma v.
Daisy Mfg. Co., 775 F. Supp. 41, 42 (D. Conn. 1991).
207 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(g)(1) (one year after final judgment).
208 Conaty v. Cath. Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., No. 08C-05-050, 2011 WL
2297712, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 19, 2011); Campbell v. Robinson, No. 06C-05-
176, 2007 WL 1765558, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 19, 2007).
209 R. & G. Orthopedic Appliances & Prosthetics, Inc. v. Curtin, 596 A.2d 530,
544 (D.C. 1991).
210 FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (2021); Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Gelsomino, 262 So.
3d 755, 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
211 The defendant must plead the fault of any non-party. FLA. STAT.
§ 768.81(3)(a)(1).
212 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33(b) (2021); Martin v. Six Flags Over Georgia II,
L.P., 801 S.E.2d 24, 36 (Ga. 2017) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33(b)).
213 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33(c).
214 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31(a) (2020); Ozaki v. Ass’n of Apartment Own-
ers of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 644, 647 (Haw. 1998).
215 Only applies in actions that sound entirely in negligence. Ozaki, 954 P.2d at
648.
216 IDAHO CODE § 6-803(3) (2021); Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 141 P.3d 1099,
1104 (Idaho 2006).
217 Can allocate to employers. See Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Prods., Inc., 690
P.2d 324, 330–31 (Idaho 1984).
218 See Antonicelli v. Rodriguez, 104 N.E.3d 1211, 1216 (Ill. 2018).
219 IND. CODE § 34-51-2-8(b)(1) (2021); Ind. Dep’t of Ins. v. Everhart, 960
N.E.2d 129, 138 (Ind. 2012).
220 IND. CODE § 34-51-2-8(b)(1). Setoff of amount paid by settlement offsets a
defendant’s liability only if the defendant asserts a non-party defense against the
settling party. R.L. McCoy, Inc. v. Jack, 772 N.E.2d 987, 991 (Ind. 2002).
221 IOWA CODE § 668.4 (2021). Joint and several liability does not apply to de-
fendants found to be less than 50% of the total fault; any defendant found to
bear 50% or more of fault is only jointly and severally liable for economic dam-
ages. Id.; see also Reilly v. Anderson, 727 N.W.2d 102, 113 (Iowa 2006).
222 IOWA CODE § 668.4.
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Kansas X223 No224
Kentucky X225 Yes226 No227
Louisiana X228 Yes229
Maine X230 No231 X232
Maryland X233
Massachusetts X234 No235
Michigan X236 No237 No238 X239
Minnesota X240 X241 X242
Mississippi X243 Yes244 No
Missouri X245 No X246
223  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (2020); see Watco Cos. v. Campbell, 371 P.3d
360, 366 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016); Simmons v. Porter, 312 P.3d 345, 351 (Kan. 2013).
224 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(c) (on motion of any party at fault, any non-
party at fault must be joined as an additional party).
225 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(1)(b) (West 2021).
226 See id. § 411.182(4).
227 Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Ky. 2001).
228 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (2021).
229 Fault is allocated “regardless of whether the person is a party to the action
or a nonparty, and regardless of the person’s insolvency, ability to pay, [or] im-
munity by statute . . . .” Id. art. 2323(A); see also Keith v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 694
So. 2d 180, 182 (La. 1997).
230 ME. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (2021).
231 The jury may compare the conduct of seller with that of the plaintiff, other
than that based on failure to discover the defect. Hinton v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 828 F. Supp. 2d 366, 382 (D. Me. 2011).
232 Plaintiff cannot recover if equally at fault. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156.
233 Carter v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Tr., 96 A.3d 147, 159 (Md.
2014).
234 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (2021). But see Shantigar Found. v. Bear
Mountain Builders, 804 N.E.2d 324, 333 (Mass. 2004) (“Under our current sys-
tem of joint and several liability, a plaintiff injured by more than one tortfeasor
may sue any or all of them for her full damages.”).
235 Can only allocate among parties to the lawsuit. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231,
§ 85; Shantigar, 804 N.E.2d at 332.
236 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304(4) (2021).
237 Id. § 600.6304(1)(b).
238 Id. § 600.6304(8).
239 Id. § 600.6304(6)(b).
240 MINN. STAT. § 604.02(1) (2020).
241 “[P]ersons are jointly and severally liable for the whole award” if the per-
son’s fault “is greater than 50 percent . . . .” Id.
242 Id. § 604.02(2) (within one year after judgment).
243 MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(5) (2021).
244 Includes fault by immune tortfeasors. Id.
245 MO. REV. STAT. § 537.067(2) (2020).
246 Joint and several liability applies to a defendant if that defendant is 51% or
more at fault. Millentree v. Tent Rest. Operations, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1072,
1074 (W.D. Mo. 2009).
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Montana X247 No248 X249 X250
Nebraska X251 Yes252
Nevada X253 No Yes254
New Hampshire X255 X256 X257
New Jersey X258 No X259
New Mexico X260 Yes261 Yes262
New York X263 Yes264 No265 X266
North Carolina X267 No
247 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(1)–(2) (2019).
248 Id. § 27-1-703(4); Metro Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 305 P.3d 832, 836
(Mont. 2013).
249 Several but not joint liability applies to any defendant determined to be
50% or less at fault. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(2).
250 Id. § 27-1-703(5).
251 Several liability for non-economic damages; joint and several liability for
economic damages. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185.10 (2020).
252 Strict liability remains joint and several. See Shipler v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
710 N.W.2d 807, 843 (Neb. 2006).
253 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141(4) (2020); Café Moda, LLC v. Palma, 272 P.3d
137, 140 (Nev. 2012).
254 Several liability does not apply for strict liability, intentional torts, or injury
arising from a product manufactured, distributed, sold, or used in Nevada. NEV.
REV. STAT. § 41.141(5)(a), (b), (e).
255 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-e(I)(a) (2021); DeBenedetto v. CLD Consult-
ing Eng’rs, Inc., 903 A.2d 969, 975 (N.H. 2006). Several liability applies to any
defendant who is less than 50% at fault. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-e(I)(b).
256 Non-settling defendant entitled to a credit for the settlement unless there is
a finding of “minimal fault.” Tiberghein v. B.R. Jones Roofing Co., 931 A.2d
1223, 1227 (N.H. 2007).
257 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-e(III).
258 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West 2021).
259 Several liability unless that party is 60% or more responsible for the total
damages. Id. § 2A:15-5.3(a), (c). If a jury assigns a percentage of fault to a settling
defendant, it operates as a credit against the plaintiff’s recovery. Rowe v. Bell &
Gossett Co., 218 A.3d 784, 789 (N.J. 2019).
260 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(A) (2021). Except for persons strictly liable for
the manufacture and sale of a defective product and several other narrow excep-
tions. Id. § 41-3A-1(C).
261 See id. § 41-3A-1(B).
262 See id. § 41-3A-1(C)(3).
263 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601(1) (McKinney 2021).
264 The fault of any non-party shall not be considered in determining liability if
unable to obtain jurisdiction over such person. See id. Several liability solely for
non-economic damages and solely in personal injury claims. See id. § 1602 (listing
14 exceptions, including “any person held liable in a product liability action
where the manufacturer of the product is not a party to the action” due to lack of
personal jurisdiction).
265 But see id. § 1602(10).
266 Several liability for a defendant that is 50% or less at fault. Id. § 1601(1).
267 Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equip. Co., 311 S.E.2d 559, 565–66 (N.C.
1984).
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North Dakota X268 Yes269 No
Ohio X270 Yes271 X272
Oklahoma X273 Yes274 Yes275
Oregon X276 No X277 X278
Pennsylvania279 X280 No281 X282
Rhode Island X283
South Carolina X284 Yes285 X286
268 N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (2021).
269 Id.
270 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.22(B) (West 2021).
271 The percentage of fault includes persons from whom the plaintiff did not
seek recovery. Id. § 2307.23(A)(2).
272 Joint and several liability for economic loss for the defendant that is more
than 50% at fault. Id. § 2307.22(A)(1).
273 OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 15(A) (2020).
274 Paul v. N. L. Indus., Inc., 624 P.2d 68, 69–70 (Okla. 1980); Bode v. Clark
Equip. Co., 719 P.2d 824, 827 (Okla. 1986).
275 Loos v. Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc., No. CIV-15-411, 2016 WL 5017335, at
*5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 19, 2016). But the amount of damages under a claim of
negligence against a manufacturer of a defective product can be allocated. Id.
276 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.610(1) (2019).
277 Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the percentage
of fault attributable to the claimant. Id. § 31.600(1).
278 Id. § 31.610(3)–(4). One year after final judgment, unless the defendant’s
fault is less than the plaintiff’s or more than 25%.
279 If a claim is settled with a pro tanto release, the verdict is setoff in the dollar
amount of the consideration paid by the settling tortfeasor to the plaintiff. Taylor
v. Solberg, 778 A.2d 664, 666 n.1 (Pa. 2001). Where the pro rata setoff method is
used, the verdict is reduced by the settling defendant’s proportionate share of
the verdict. Id.
280 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102(a.1)(1) (2021). Joint and several liability applies
to intentional torts or if the defendant is more than 60% at fault. Id. § 7102
(a.1)(3).
281 Id. § 7102(a.1)(1).
282 Id. § 7102(a).
283 Calise v. Hidden Valley Condo. Ass’n, 773 A.2d 834, 840 (R.I. 2001) (quot-
ing Roberts-Robertson v. Lombardi, 598 A.2d 1380, 1381 (R.I.1991) (per
curiam)).
284 Several liability applies to any defendant who is less than 50% at fault. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-38-15(A) (2020).
285 Other than a defendant whose conduct is willful, wanton, reckless, grossly
negligent, or intentional or involves the use, sale, or possession of alcohol or the
illicit use, sale, or possession of drugs, a defendant can assert that a non-party
contributed to the alleged injury or damages and may be liable for any or all of
the damages. Id. v15-38-15(D)–(F).
286 Joint and several liability does not apply to any defendant whose conduct is
less than 50% of the total fault of all defendants and plaintiff. Id. § 15-38-15(A).
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South Dakota X287 Yes288 No X289
Tennessee X290 Yes291 Yes292
Texas X293 Yes294 No X295 X296
Utah X297 Yes298 X299
Vermont X300
Virginia X301
287 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 15-8-15.1 (2021). A modified form of several liability
applies such that a party less than 50% at fault under joint and several liability
may not be liable for more than twice its percentage of fault.
288 See id. § 15-8-15.2.
289 Id. § 15-8-15.1.
290 McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992); see also McNabb v.
Highways, Inc., 98 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Tenn. 2003).
291 Plaintiff can add non-parties as parties to the case even if the statute of
limitations has run if the plaintiff files an amended pleading within ninety days of
the answer alleging such non-party’s fault. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1-119(a)
(2021).
292 Strict liability remains joint and several. Owens v. Truckstops of Am., 915
S.W.2d 420, 432 (Tenn. 1996) (“[J]oint and several liability against parties in the
chain of distribution of a product is essential to the theory of strict products
liability.”).
293 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.011(4), 33.013(a).
294 Those subject to a “percentage of responsibility” include “each claimant,
each defendant, each settling person, or each responsible third party . . . .” Id.
§ 33.011.
295 Joint and several liability applies to a defendant who is more than 50% at
fault. Id. § 33.013(b)(1).
296 Id. § 33.015(c). If a liable defendant does not pay its proportion, the re-
maining defendants who are jointly and severally liable must contribute based on
their respective percentages of responsibility.
297 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-818(3), -819 (West 2021).
298 Non-parties at fault can be on the verdict form, and fault can be allocated
to the “empty chair” when identified appropriately and timely. Id. § 78B-5-818(2);
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 9(l) (Allocation of fault). Utah’s legislature made these
restrictions in response to the decision in Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 1078,
1080–81 (Utah 1998), which limited allocation to non-parties. Many thanks to
Edward Havas for his contribution at the Air Law Symposium to this entry.
299 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-818(2). A plaintiff may recover only from any de-
fendant or group of defendants whose fault, combined with the fault of persons
immune from suit and nonparties to whom fault is allocated, exceeds the fault of
the person seeking recovery.
300 Where the plaintiff is comparatively negligent, and recovery is allowed
against more than one defendant, each defendant is liable only for his percent-
age of the negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is al-
lowed. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (2021).
301 When two or more tortfeasors cause a single indivisible injury to a third
party and “it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to
the injury,” then an individual tortfeasor can be held liable for the entire injury.
Dickenson v. Tabb, 156 S.E.2d 795, 801 (Va. 1967); Gross v. Shearson Lehman
Bros. Holdings, Inc., 43 F. App’x 672, 677 (4th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (per
curiam).
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Washington X302 Yes303
West Virginia X304 X305
Wisconsin X306 No Yes307 X308
Wyoming X309 Yes310 No
302 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (2021). Joint and several liability applies if the
plaintiff was not at fault. Id. § 4.22.070(1)(b).
303 The total fault is allocated from the plaintiff, defendants, third-party de-
fendants, entities released by the plaintiff, entities with any other individual de-
fense against the plaintiff, and entities immune from liability to the plaintiff. Id.
§ 4.22.070(1). However, defendant(s) may not allocate fault to those immune
from the suit, including immune employers. Edgar v. City of Tacoma, 919 P.2d
1236, 1242 (Wash. 1996) (en banc).
304 W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13c(a) (2021).
305 Id. § 55-7-13c(d). The plaintiff may reallocate uncollectable amounts
against other parties found to be liable if sought “not later than one year after
judgment becomes final through lapse of time for appeal or through exhaustion
of appeal, whichever occurs later . . . .”
306 The liability of a defendant who is less than 51% at fault is limited to the
percentage of the total causal negligence attributed to that person. WIS. STAT.
§ 895.045(1) (2021).
307 Several liability applies to negligence but does not apply to strict product
liability claims. Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 833, 836
(Wis. 2001).
308 Joint and several liability applies to a defendant who is 51% or more at
fault. WIS. STAT. § 895.045(1).
309 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(e) (2021).
310 Erdelyi v. Lott, 326 P.3d 165, 175–76 (Wyo. 2014).
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APPENDIX C
A. A MODEST FORUM SHOPPING LIST
When considering the pursuit or defense of multiple lawsuits
involving the same parties in multiple jurisdictions, counsel
should consider a broader range of issues likely to vary in each
potential venue, in addition to the specific items discussed in
this Article. Because some lawyers have limited experience liti-
gating in other states, this Article offers a checklist of some top-
ics that may require review or analysis as to each potential
venue. These topics can be important for a variety of reasons,
such as (1) helping to decide the pros and cons of the various
jurisdictions, (2) whether to challenge jurisdiction or venue, (3)
how to prepare for litigation in a particular venue, (4) identify-
ing issues on which choice of law will be critical, and (5) antici-
pating how the allocation of fault will be treated in each forum,
and the consequences of variations among the states in which
the lawsuits might be, or have already been, filed.
B. A PRELIMINARY OUTLINE FOR EACH FORUM
Please Adapt to Address the Specifics of Each Case
I. Law
A. Significant Differences in Tort Law
B. Choice of Law Rules
C. Statutes of Limitation
D. Statutes of Repose
E. Malfunction/Res Ipsa Loquitor
F. Substantive Legal Standards: e.g., in a product liability
action: Is the forum a consumer expectations or risk-util-
ity jurisdiction?
G. Known Unknowns: e.g., is a key legal issue in limbo, or
is the appellate court in limbo?
1. “It is essential for the bench and bar to recognize
that the test we articulate today is not intended as a
rigid formula to be offered to the jury in all
situations.”311
2. “We agree that evidence related to risk-utility bal-
ancing, which may include proof that a practicable
and feasible design alternative was available, will not
always be necessary to prove that a product’s design
is defective and unreasonably dangerous, i.e., that
311 Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 408 (Pa. 2014).
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the product failed to meet ordinary consumer ex-
pectations. However, because the parties did not
dispute that evidence related to risk-utility balanc-
ing was necessary in this case, we leave for another
day the question under what circumstances ORS
30.920 requires a plaintiff to support a product lia-
bility design-defect claim with evidence related to
risk-utility balancing of the kind discussed above.”312
3. How judges are selected
4. Any recent drastic changes in judges (and their phi-
losophies) in certain states, e.g., Florida, Penn-
sylvania, California
H. Affirmative Defenses Available/Unavailable?
1. Comparative Fault
2. Third-Party Fault
3. Assumption of Risks
4. Modification/Misuse of Product
5. Spoliation
I. Allocation of Fault
1. Several?
2. Effect of Settlements on Unsettled Claims
3. Non-Parties
4. Defendant Who Can’t Pay
J. Evidence
1. Expert Testimony Criteria—Daubert? Rigorous?
2. Treatment of OSI Evidence
3. Product Alteration
4. Post-Accident Remedial Measures in Product Liabil-
ity Case
II. Trial
A. Length of Time to Trial
B. Quality of Judges
C. Education/Biases of Jurors
D. Jury Selection Process
E. Verdict—Unanimous/Less Rigorous
III. Damages
A. What’s awarded—e.g., wrongful death?
B. Pre-death Pain & Suffering
C. Damages Caps
D. Punitive Damages Rules/Procedures
312 McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 331–32 (Or. 2001).
